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STRUCTURAL PREREQUISITES OF 
ELITE INTEGRATION IN THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Ursula Hoffmann-Lange 
INTRODUCTION 
In the following study we shall give some empirical evidence conceming the 
extent to which elite integration in the Federal Republic of Germany is struc-
turally determined. For that purpose, we shall use data from a national elite 
survey carried out in 1981. Given the universal importance of elite integration for 
the stability of political systems the quest for the mechanisms by which it is 
brought about or impeded has to be considered as a central topic of elite theory 
and elite research. I 
In accordance with Field and Higley (1985) we define elite integration as a 
network of institutionalized relations within an elite, as weil as the widespread 
existence of procedural norms guiding elite behavior which facilitate policy 
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fonnation. This definition implies two different types of integration, namely, 
structural integration and ideological integration. "Structural integration" refers 
to the extensive fonnal and infonnal networks of personal communication, 
friendship, and influence among all the persons who constitute a national elite 
(Kadushin, 1979), while "value consensus" refers to the "unanimity with 
which these persons observe mainly infonnal rules and codes of political con-
duct" (Field and Higley, paper in this volume). 
Ideological integration is usually measured by the degree of consensus that 
exists within an elite with regard to poJitical goals or to the aforementioned rules 
of political conduct. 2 In order to measure structural integration three different 
subtypes can be distinguished and measured separately: 
• Infonnal social integration, i.e., networks of friendship ties among elite 
members 
• Professional integration, i.e., networks of contacts among position holders 
in the context of their regular organizational activities 
• Integration of the policy fonnation process, i.e., networks of contacts with 
which elite members try to influence political decisions 
While the first subtype includes, by definition, only informal relations among 
elites, the latter two can be based on fonnal as weil as informal relations, and the 
degree of correspondence between fonnal and infonnal ties is in itself an impor-
Iant variable. 
Most of the variables we shall be studying in this paper belong to a set of 
c\assic components of elite research, i.e., social background, career experience, 
and interlocking positions. These factors have often been considered as indica-
tors of infonnal elite integration, and their importance has been stressed by 
scholars who favor the idea that all societies are dominated by smalI, distinctive, 
and cohesive elites, and that elite power is maintained primarily by two pro-
cesses: cooptation and contro\. "Influence theories" which assume that these 
processes are of central importance even among modem elites in industrial 
societies, are widespread not only as a popular myth but also among power elite 
theorists (e.g., Domhoff, 1979; Miliband, 1969).3 
Cooptation means that only the "right" persons are recruited into the elite and 
that access is denied to persons who might wish to change the existing structure 
of privileges in a society. This process can be studied by analyzing the elites' 
social background and career patterns wh ich give insights into the rules deter-
mining wh ich persons are selected and groomed for elite positions. 
Control. on the other hand, implies that individual elite members exert a wider 
influence which transcends the fonnal power attached to their position. This can 
be accomplished by simultaneously holding positions in more than one organiza-
tion and also through membership in informal groups where relevant infonnation 
can be exchanged with persons sharing one' s values and interests. The concept of 
Elite Integration in West Germany 47 
control has also often been used to define the power that one organization or 
societal sector exerts over other seemingly independent organizations or sectors, 
e.g., the economic dependence of smaller enterprises on assets and orders from 
bigger ones. Similarly, it has often been assumed that in capitalist societies the 
economic sector exerts a high degree of control over decision making in the 
political-administrative sectors. 
In order to study informal elite integration of this kind many scholars have 
relied exclusively on data concerning the social and professional homogeneity of 
elites. This homogeneity was assumed to facilitate informal elite integration and 
was measured by social class background, attendance at exclusive private 
schools, membership in prestigious clubs, free circulation between different 
sectors, and multiple position holding. Several recent studies have, instead, tried 
to measure elite integration directly by using network data on interaction among 
elites (cf. Higley et al. , 1979; Moore, 1979; Laumann and Pappi, 1976).4 The 
availability of such network data allows a test of the assumptions underlying the 
use ofthe indirect measures which we propose to call "structural prerequisites of 
elite integration" and to distinguish them from elite integration itself. 
The importance attributed to these structural factors is mainly based on the 
assumption that social similarity, measured by homogeneity of social back-
ground and career experiences, prornotes friendship ties among people. 5 These, 
in turn, are assumed to facilitate cooperation among elites by creating a climate 
of solidarity and confidence (cf. Dahrendorf, I 965a; Domhoff, 1979). Two more 
implicit assumptions based on this line of reasoning should be mentioned. The 
first is the idea that there exist institutions of elite socialization which impart 
generalized leadership qualifications rather than expertise and that these qualifi-
cations enable elite members to take over many elite positions, regardless of the 
specific problem to be confronted. As a result, frequent elite circulation is made 
possible. Secondly, exc1usive social backgrounds and elite socialization are 
thought to promote the maintenance of a homogeneous elite which is clearly 
distinguished from the rest of society. 
The distinction between the structural prerequisites of elite integration and 
integration itself leads to the question of the extent to which informal elite 
circles, based on similarity of background and informal friendship ties originat-
ing in common attendance at elite schools or universities, form a basis for 
informal networks of elite decision making. Such a basis would indicate the 
existence of a relatively closed elite. A model of multiple elites (leadership 
groups) presupposes, instead, that elite recruitment primarily stresses criteria of 
professional achievement. 
Presenting the results of our elite survey, we want to discuss the importance 
which must be attributed to the traditional variables in elite research in a modem 
industrial society in the light of some recent studies on elite integration. We are 
mainly interested in the extent of the social and professional homogeneity of 
elites. Our main assumption is that with the growing complexity of a social 
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system the importance of formal relations, as compared to informal ones, in-
creases. That means that in industrial societies interpersonal elite contacts based 
primarilyon the formal requirements of an elite position are more important than 
informal friendship ties based on social and professional homogeneity. In turn, 
increasing importance of formal relations renders the existence of a closed elite 
less likely and the incumbents of elite positions therefore become nothing more 
than a part of the upper stratum of a hierarchically differentiated society. 
Nevertheless, informal relations among elites continue to play an important 
role, even when they are no longer exclusively determined by attributes which 
are independent of the elite position. In addition, they do not presuppose friend-
ship relations: "In power circle terms there is no requirement that affects f10w 
through the system, only power and influence on a regular basis" (Kadushin, 
1979:133). Informal relations which are used to influence political decision 
making are mainly based on instrumental considerations, which may include the 
use of friendship ties but also the use of connections based on other factors. 
We assurne, however, that there exist considerable cultural differences with 
regard to the role played by informal mechanisms of elite integration. These 
differences indicate that traditional elite segments are capable of maintaining old 
power positions. This makes comparative study of the structural prerequisites of 
elite integration especially interesting. 
In the last section of the paper, we shall analyze the relationship between 
social and professional similarity and the political beliefs of elites. We shall 
therefore limit ourselves to studying only one poJitical factor-namely, the party 
preferences of the respondents. In a democratic polity with party competition, 
party preference can be considered the major indicator of political c1eavages 
among elites and highly interrelated with their issue attitudes. 6 
Since aII available empirical evidence shows a negligible association between 
structural variables of elite homogeneity and the political beliefs of elites,7 we 
assume that the structural variables have little explanatory value in c1arifying 
actual elite behavior which is predominantly determined by positional require-
ments. The latter are also decisive in determining the extent to which an organi-
zation demands homogeneous political outlooks in its personneJ. If these are 
irrelevant for the elite role, political heterogeneity can be tolerated. We cannot, 
however, make causal assertions concerning the relationship between the elite 
role and political heliefs: ideological predispositions may determine an indi-
vidual's decision to enter a certain career as much as the occupation, in turn, may 
have an impact on the political beliefs of that person. 
DATA BASE 
The data on which our analyses are based were gathered from the larger project 
HElites in the Federal Republic of Germany 1981" headed by Rudolf Wilden-
Table 1. Sector Composition and Response Rates in the West German Elite Study, 1981 
Position Holders (= Target 
Positions Persons) Respondents 
Response Rate 
Percemage Percenlage Percentage (Percentage Respondents 
of Sample 0/ Sample 0/ Sampfe 0/ Position Holders in 
See(or n Total n Total n Total Sector) 
Politics 539 15.1 452 14.3 274 15.7 60.6 
Civil service 479 13.4 471 14.9 296 17.0 62.8 
~ Business 837 23.4 688 21.7 285 16.3 41.4 Business asso-
ciations 394 11.0 296 9.4 174 10.0 58.8 
Trade unions 155 4.3 155 4.9 87 5.0 56.1 
Massmedia 376 10.5 354 11.2 222 12.7 62.7 
Academic 209 5.8 179 5.7 130 7.5 72.6 
Military 172 4.8 172 5.4 43 2.5 25.0 
Cultural 188 5.3 180 5.7 104 6.0 57.8 
Olbel'" --.lli ~ ~ ~ 129 -.:JA 59.2 
Total 3580 100.1 3165 100.1 1744 100.1 55.1 
aProfessional associations. consumers' associations. the judiciary. churcbes. and mayors and administrative heads of the 15 biggest eities. Additionally, a number of persons who lost their 
elite positions during the stage of field work but were nevertheless interviewed. 
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mann and Max Kaase at the University of Mannheim.8 We use the data ofa 1981 
elite survey which incJudes 1744 interviews with respondents in top positions in 
the sectors of politics, the civil service, business corporations, business associa-
tions, trade unions, mass media, the military, and the intelligencia, as weil as 
those in some minor sectors such as the judiciary, the churches, professional 
associations, and local elites whieh were assigned to the residual sector 
"others. " 
Table I shows the number of respondents in the different sectors as weil as the 
response rates. All interviews were personal interviews averaging one and a half 
hours in length. The interview posed questions concerning demographic vari-
ables, political beliefs, and positional activities as weil as sociometric questions 
about regular contacts with other organizations and other personal contaets in the 
eontext of the one national issue whieh dominated the activities of the respondent 
at the time of the interview. 
A part of the questionnaire, the demographie questions and the opinion ques-
tions, was also used in a general population survey at the beginning of 1982. We 
are therefore able to compare the answers of the elites to those of the population 
sampIe. Analyses of these population data have here been limited, however, to a 
group comparable to the elite survey in age and gen der , namely the male popula-
tion over 40 years of age. 
Moreover, we can also refer to the results of two previous elite surveys whieh 
used a similar approach and allowed a comparison of German e1ites over aperiod 
of time. The first survey was done in 1968 and included 808 interviews; the 
seeond one with 1825 interviews was earried out in 1972. 9 The eomparisons 
have mostly been limited, however, to the results of analyses reported in Enke 
(1974) for the 1968 survey and in Hoffmann-Lange et al. (1980; see also their 
paper in this volume) for the 1972 survey. A secondary analysis of the two older 
data-sets was not undertaken because it would have required detailed examina-
tion of all elite positions included in the three studies as weil as extensive data 
transfonnations. The gain in information thereby attained would, in our opinion, 
not have justified the necessary amount of work. Due to differences in the 
sampIes, the wording of questions, and the categories used for analysis, the 
comparison is limited to relatively crude assertions about changes over a long 
time period. 
In the future, we intend to complete the analyses presented here by relating 
them to the sociometric data of the 1981 survey. That will allow us to test some 
assumptions about relations between demographie variables and political beliefs, 
on the one hand, and the more direct indicators of elite integration, on the other. 
We nevertheless believe that the results presented here are valuable in giving a 
full picture of important demographie characteristics of both elites and the popu-
lation in West Germany and of their relationship to party preference. 
Elite Integration in West Germany 51 
SOCIAL HOMOGENEITY OF ELITES 
In this section, we discuss a number of the measures of social homogeneity of 
elites and their validity as indicators of informal social elite integration. Aside 
from family background, these are: education, membership in voluntary associa-
tions, and the regional proximity of elites. Each of these factors influences the 
opportunities for informal social relations among elites. Since it is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to measure directly the existence of informal social 
circles among national elites-in contrast to the relatively small elites of minor 
or medium-sized communities-these variables must still be considered as the 
best available indicators of the social cohesion of elites. The desirability of 
informal elite integration is, however, controversial. While Dahrendorf consid-
ers the existence of an "established" elite as an important prerequisite of "rep-
resentative government within a liberal constitution" (Dahrendorf, 1965a:302), 
power elite theorists have stressed the problem of the nonresponsiveness of a 
socially homogeneous and cohesive ruling class (e.g., Domhoff, 1979). 
Sodal C1ass Background and Education 
Whereas the actual degree of elite integration gives clues concerning the char-
acler of elites, analysis of social and professional recruitment shows the degree to 
wh ich access to elite positions is open to all members of a society. "Open" 
means that access to the elites is not restricted to persons with ascribed charac-
teristics such as exclusive social cJass background or to members of other delim-
itable social categories (religion, race) , but occurs according to criteria of 
achievement. Openness in this sense does not mean total equality of opportunity 
for everyone at all times because we assurne that successful incumbency in an 
elite role requires special abilities. Openness has, therefore, to be operationalized 
as equality of opportunity for those persons capable of fulfilling the role require-
ments of elite positions. As an indicator of qualifications, we have used educa-
tional degrees. This ensures that a certain level of knowledge has been acquired 
in educational institutions. In many elite sectors, a higher educational degree is a 
formal precondition for entry. 
As a beginning, a comparison of the profiles of social class origins of members 
of the elite with a cross section of the adult male population (age: above 40 years) 
provides some information on the extent 10 which persons from lower social 
backgrounds have succeeded in achieving elite positions. Social background was 
measured as the occupational status of the respondent's father at the time when 
the respondent was about 15 years old. Social background may influence access 
to elite positions directly and indirecdy. Indirectly, the father' s occupational 
status influences the opportunity for a child to obtain a higher educational de-
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gree, which in turn is a precondition for an elite career. But there are other 
advantages provided by a privileged family background, e.g., good connections, 
money, and self-assurance, which mayaiso facilitate access to the elite. The 
more important the direct advantages of background, the more it is justified to 
speak of lack of openness among elites. 
Before analyzing the data on social background, adecision had to be made 
about whether the many categories which had been used to measure the occupa-
tional status of a respondent' s father should be recoded using a status or a class 
concept. We decided to use the latter because the status concept is mainly based 
on the prestige of occupations and therefore is not independent of the educational 
level of aperson. Since the educational level of the father, in turn, is highly 
intercorrelated with that of the respondent, a status concept would not provide an 
independent measure of social background. In addition, it neglects the control 
potential of an occupation which power elite theories regard as important for 
securing access to elite positions. 
The class scheme developed by E. O. Wright seemed most useful for our 
purpose. \0 1t takes into account four dimensions of occupations: (I) controlof 
one's own work process, (2) control ofthe work of others, (3) control of strategie 
decisions in an organization, and (4) control of the means of production (Wright 
et al., 1982:712ff.).11 Wright et al. (1982:722ff.) and Mj\'lset and Petersen 
(1983) show that this classification of the father's occupation is suitable for the 
determination of occupational chances, for example, of women and minorities. It 
should therefore allow us to determine whether the occupational status of the 
respondent' s father was important for attaining elite status. 
Tables 2 and 3 present the percentage breakdown (i.e., marginals) for the 
social class background of elites and the general population and the relationship 
between social class background and education. The small numbers made it 
necessary to condense the categories of both variables into two broad categories. 
While within the elites there were almost no respondents in the lower background 
and educational categories, the same was true within the population sampie for 
the higher categories. Within the elites as within the population, respondents 
coming from a working-class background differ most from other respondents. 
In looking at tbe marginals for social class background (Table 2), we see that 
only a minority of elites (38.4 percent) is recruited from the lowest two class 
categories whereas the overwhelming majority of tbe population (74 percent) 
comes from these classes. On the other hand, the fathers of the elite were 
disproportionately self-employed (28.1 percent) or belonged to upper or middle 
management (33.4 percent). But it is noteworthy that only 15.4 percent of the 
elites were recruited from the upper class (bourgeoisie or upper management) 
while the elite respondents without exception currently belong to this class. 
This means that the degree of inheritance of elite status in the Federal Republic 
is rather low. One might, however, argue that our elite sampie is much too large 
Table 2. Social Class Origin and Education by Sector 
(percentages based on number of valid answers) 
Occupational Status 0/ Respondent' s F ather Respondent' s Education 
Peuy High School 
Bourgeoisie Bourgeoisie Graduation 
(Employers Smoll (Self- (Abitur) 
with at Employers Employed Semi- After 13 
least /0 (2-9 0-1 aulOnomous Years 0/ University 
Employees) Employees) Employee) Managers Supervisors Employees Workers Schoo/ing Degree 
Elite Sector n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % 
SociaJ Democratie 
politicians 
(SPD) 0 0.0 6 5.6 6 5.6 5 4.6 22 20.4 24 22.2 45 41.7 78 64.5 67 55.4 
\2 
Christian Demo-
etatie politicians 
(CDU/CSUj 8 7.2 24 21.6 11 9.9 3 2.7 16 14.4 28 25.2 21 18.9 101 80.8 92 73.6 
Liberal politicians 
(FDP) 4 16.7 4 16.7 4.2 5 20.8 6 25.0 3 12.5 1 4.2 21 84.0 17 68.0 
CiviJ service 9 3.3 37 13.7 19 7.0 12 4.4 84 31.1 86 31.9 23 8.5 286 97.3 276 93.9 
Business 44 16.9 21 8.0 20 7.7 26 10.0 60 23.0 60 23.0 30 11.5 250 87.7 214 75.1 
Business associa· 
tions 34 20.7 30 18.3 11 6.7 19 11.6 39 23.8 26 15.9 5 3.0 150 86.2 118 67.8 
Trade unions 0 0.0 6 7.8 4 5.2 1 1.3 5 6.5 14 18.2 47 61.0 17 19.5 7 8.0 
Mass media 15 7.4 12 5.9 24 11.9 15 7.4 65 32.2 50 24.8 21 10.4 208 93.7 105 47.3 
Aeademie 6 5.2 13 11.3 12 10.4 6 5.2 40 34.8 24 20.9 14 12.2 130 100.0 125 96.2 
Military 2 4.9 I 2.4 2 4.9 3 7.3 20 48.8 12 29.3 I 2.4 40 93.0 14 32.6 
Cultural 8 8.4 11 11.6 10 10.5 10 10.5 28 29.5 19 20.0 9 9.5 92 88.5 64 61.5 
Other 6 5.0 11 9.2 15 12.5 3 2.5 38 31.7 30 25.0 17 14.2 \07 82.9 92 71.3 
TOf<l1 136 8.6 176 11.1 135 8.5 108 6.8 423 26.6 376 23.7 234 14.7 1480 85.1 1191 68.5 
Population ....A 40 9.0 58 13.1 --P 18 4.1 61 13.7 267 60.1 60 11.7 33 6.4 
"'Because of small numbers. persons belonging to tbe categmy BOlU'geoisie were assigned to the category Small Employers. and those of the category Managers to the category Supervisors. 
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Table 3. Socia! Class Origin and Education of E!ites and Nonelites 
(percentages based on number of valid answers) 
Elites Nonelites 
Less than High Less chan High 
High Schaol School High School Schaol 
Occupational Status Graduation Graduation Graduation Graduation 
oJ Respondent' s (Abitur) (Abitur) (Abitur) (Abitur) 
Father (%) (%) Total (%) (%) Total 
Workers 48.9 51.l (n = 233) 96.6 3.4 (n = 265) 
100.0 100.0 
Other occupations 8.9 91.1 (n = 1353) 76.7 23.3 (n = 176) 
100.0 100.0 
to constitute areal ruling class and that the results would be quite different if it 
were concentrated on a smaller and more exciusive elite circie. The empirical 
evidence presented by Moore and Alba (1982:54ff.) and Moore (1979:687) does, 
however, argue against this because these authors did not find any significant 
association between social ciass background and sociometric data on elite 
integration. 
Although we have no empirica! measure for the membership of respondents in 
elite circles, we did test for a relationship between social dass background and 
seniority of position. Dividing the positionally defined sampIe into two catego-
ries of incumbents of more important (28.3 percent) and less important (71.1 
percent) positions, we found no significant relation between the level of position 
and social ciass background of a respondent (p = .16). Although this result does 
not preclude the existence of informal circies of exdusive ciass background 
within the elites, it does indicate that these circies may not be used to dominate 
the political decision-making process since they do not partake of the entire range 
of relevant positions. 
Our results can, however, be interpreted as a dear confirmation of the "law of 
increasing disproportion" described by Putnam, i.e., a general tendency towards 
the agglutination of social and political status factors (l976:33ff.).12 This ten-
dency also exists for education: while only 11.7 percent of our population sampie 
graduated from high school, this is also true for 85.1 % of the elite respondents 
(Table 2).13 
Table 4 contains the associations between the three variables of social dass 
background, education, and elite status. All zero-order relationships between 
these variables are significant but vary in strength. From the multitude of possi-
ble measures of association we started by computing Phi which is based on X2 
and, for fourfold tables, is identical to Pearson's r. In comparing the magnitudes 
of Phi between tables, this measure has the disadvantage that its empirically 
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Table 4. Associations Between Variables 
x2 P Phi PhilPhim= 
1. Simple associations 
Social origin by elite status 383.8 0.00 .44 .47 
Social origin by education 583.0 0.00 .54 .63 
Education by elite status 881.5 0.00 .66 .84 
2. Social origin by education. controlled for 
elite status-Model I 
Nonelites 41.7 0.00 .31 .70 
Elites 251.8 0.00 .40 .40 
3. Social origin by elite status. controlled 
for education-Model II 
Less than high school graduation (Abitur) 17.5 0.00 .17 .18 
High schol graduation (Abitur) 4.9 0.02 .06 .10 
4. Education by elite status. controlled for 
social origin-Model III 
Workers 147.6 0.00 .54 .87 
Olher occupations 513.0 0.00 .58 .72 
attainable upper limit depends on the distributions of the marginals and that it 
attains its theoretical upper value of I only under an equal distribution of tbe 
marginals of the two variables. Therefr,re, a comparison presupposes a standar-
dization of Phi for the upper value it can attain under the given marginals, Le., 
the computation of Phi/Phimax .14 
Among tbe zero-order assocations the one between education and elite status is 
tbe highest (Phi/Phimax = .84). Elite status here means even more than mem-
bership in the two highest class categories. When we compare the education of 
the elites to that of the members of these two class categories within the general 
population, we see that the percentage difference between persons with high 
school graduation (Abitur) amounts to 40.7 percent (Table 5). 
Asking for the causes for the agglutination process in elite composition is 
equivalent to asking about the degree of openness of the elites. To answer this 
question, it is necessary to determine the relative importance of social class 
background and education for elite status. Both independent variables are closely 
interrelated with elite status and can, taken separately, be considered as evidence 
for contradictory assumptions: the disproportionate recruitment of elites from the 
upper classes as evidence for the continuing importance of inheritance of wealth 
and the processes of deliberate cooptation, and the higher educationallevel of the 
elites as evidence for the importance of achievement criteria. Only a muItivariate 
analysis of the interrelations of all three variables can give conclusive evidence 
conceming the explanatory value of each of these hypotheses , because it is the 
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Table 5. Educationall..evel of Elites and Members of the Upper Classes 
Within the Population at Large 
Population: 
Occupational Status 
Bourgeoisie or 
Elites Managers" 
n % n % 
Less !han high 
school graduation 259 14.9 15 55.6 
High school gradua-
tion 1480 85.1 12 44.4 
University degree 1191 68.5 6 22.2 
Total 1739 100.0 27 100.0 
IlBecause of the smalJ size of this group, all respondents of these occupational status categories were included in the 
table, not ooly the male adults of 40 years and more (of which only 16 respondents were in the sampie). The 
number is still extremely small: respondents in these two occupational categories make up only 1.6% of the total 
sampie of the warking population. 
precondition for causal inferences. Putnam discusses four conceivable causal 
models (Figure 1) for the relationship between social class background, educa-
tion and elite status (1976:29ff.). 
Model I is not compatible with our data because the association between social 
cIass background and education does not disappear when we control for elite 
status, i.e., look at elites and nonelites separately. We can also refute Model III 
which assurnes that there is no relationship between elite status and education 
when we control for class background because education and elite status are both 
determined by class. Independent of background, the proportion of persons with . 
Modell 
Education Social Class 
~~round 
Elite Status 
Modellll 
Education ... -------Social Class 
Background -----Elite Status 
Model 11 
Education ... -------Social Class 
Background 
Elite Status 
Mode/IV 
Education • Social Class 
~~round 
Elite Status 
Figure 1 
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a high school degree is much higher within the elites. Models Il and IV remain to 
be interpreted. Whereas Model IV assurnes that social dass background has an 
indirect-via better education-as weil as a direct effect on the attainment of 
elite status, Model Il postulates that there is no direct effect at all. The crucial test 
of the relative validity of the two models occurs when we control for education. 
Model Il assurnes that the relationship between social class background and elite 
status is entirely due to the fact that persons from higher dasses have more 
opportunity for a better education. If so, the re)ationship between dass and elite 
status should disappear as soon as we control for education. This is not entirely 
the case. Table 4 shows that there remains a significant direct effect of class even 
if we contro) for education. In relation to the indirect effect it seems, however, 
too small to support Model IV. Recruitment for the elites thus proceeds mainly 
through the channel of educational institutions . Even among the elites with 
working-class background 51. I percent have a high school degree compared to 
only 3.4 percent of the population coming from that class. This can be in-
terpreted as an indication that elites-independent oftheir father's occupation-
come from families with high educational aspirations. This assumption is also 
supported by the fact that the association between social class background and 
education is weaker among the elites. 
We have so far looked at the elites in aglobaI manner and compared them to 
the population at large in order to show the importance of education for elite 
recruitment. In doing this, we have neglected the differences in the social class 
recruitment of the different sectors . The figures in Table 2 show that among SPD 
politicians and among trade union leaders, higher education is obviously less 
important. These two groups are also recruited to a considerable degree from 
working class and lower white-collar employee families: 32.4 percent of the 
Social Democratic politicians, 45.5 percent of the trade union leaders but also 
15.3 percent of the Christian Democratic politicians had fathers of blue-collar 
status, while the blue-collar stratum plays a negligible role in elite recruitment 
(Only 11.2 percent of all elites come from blue-collar families in contrast to 57.4 
percent of the population at large). 
From these data we conclude that even today within the elite segments repre-
senting the tradition of the working-class movement there exist recruitment paths 
into the elite where political activity can compensate for lack of educational 
credentials. The Christian working-class movement within the Christian Demo-
cratic Party (Sozialausschüsse) also belongs to this tradition. Thus, about 6.5 
percent of the elites come from a population stratum with two disadvantages: a 
working-class background and a low level of education. Compared to the elite 
surveys of 1968 and 1972, no significant changes in the social recruitment basis 
of the different sectors could be detected (Table 6). Even though the occupational 
categories and the sampling criteria are not exactly comparable across the stud-
ies, business associations, the military, business, and academic elites are the 
sectors with the highest percentage of upper-class recruitment. The elites in the 
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Table 6. Recruitment of Elite Sectors from Upper Social Class Backgrounda 
Percent 
Bourgeoisie, Small 
Employers, Upper 
Management Percent 
("Managers" ), Bourgeoisie 
Middle Management and 
("Supervisors" ): Management: 
Percent Upper-
Class Background 
/98/ /98/ /972b /968b 
Liberal politicians 79.2 37.5 
Business associations 74.4 32.3 48.9 33.8 
Military 63.4 12.2 48.6 
Cultural 60.0 18.9 
Business 57.6 26.9 33.6 45.2 
Academic 56.5 10.4 46.2 50.0 
Mass media 52.9 14.8 30.9 29.6 
Civil service 52.5 7.7 33.3 33.0 
Christian Democratic 
polilicians 45.9 9.9 
Social Democratic 
polilicians 30.6 4.6 
Trade unions 15.6 J.3 3.7 13.6 
Gin 1968 and 1972 a different c1assification was used: upper dass, upper middle dass, tower middle dass, lower 
c1ass. 
bFigures were laken from the tables of Enke (1974:76) aod Hoffmann·Lange et al. (1980:24). These studies do, 
however, not report comparable figures for the political elites. Enke ae least compares figures for the parliamentary 
elites of the "bourgeois" parties and the Social Democrats (31.3% vs. I 1. 2% upper-class background). 
Federal Republic do not differ in their upper social class background from 
American and Australian elites (Pakulski, 1982:51; Moore and Alba, 
1982:44ff,), But while the proportion of elites with self-employed fathers is 40 
percent in Australia and 48,6 percent in the United States, it is much lower in 
West Germany, namely 28.2 percent. 
Given the rather small to moderate proportions of respondents of upper-class 
origins or of those having attended prestigious private schools, Moore and Alba 
argue that privileged background per se is quite obviously not a sufficient expla-
nation for the attainment of elite status. Instead, they put forward an alternative 
explanation partly based on the extraordinarily high proportion of American 
elites with self-employed fathers, They argue that cultural values engendered by 
family background might account for the motivation toward upward mobility 
among future elites. Conceming the content of these values they offer an expla-
nation which in our opinion is typically "American," stressing the commitment 
to "career" and to control of one's own work and of the lives of others 
(1982:68), We favor, instead, an explanation more in line with the European 
tradition and would argue that the educational aspirations of the parents are the 
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dominant factor leading to career orientation. 15 Both factors are, of course, 
intimately related and our data do not allow us to decide definitely between them. 
Membership in Voluntary Associations 
Societies are normally more united at the top than at the bottom (Galtung, 
1966:162). We can therefore expeet elites more frequently to be members of 
voluntary associations than nonelites. This is true at least for American elites: 
"Elites are 'joiners'," as Dye states poignantly (1982:213). 
In this section, we wish to discuss the function of such membership for elite 
behavior and elite integration. Therefore, we have limited our analysis to mem-
bership in politically relevant organizations. Membership in associations with an 
exclusively private character, Le., local research or cultural foundations, as weil 
as leisure time associations such as sports clubs, are not considered. The impact 
of such membership for elite integration is more indirect than direet. Since most 
of these associations are organized on the basis of regional units, only activities 
on the level of the state or federal organization can contribute directly to elite 
integration. These were, however, so infrequent that we decided to analyze 
formal membership regardless of whether a person actively participated in meet-
ings or not. They have to be interpreted as an expression of interests or values 
shared by members of a certain association rather than a basis for development of 
elite circles. 
In studying membership, we are not only interested in comparing different 
elite sectors but also in comparing elites and nonelites. These comparisons will 
not only be quantitative but also qualitative. This means that in addition to 
comparing the number of persons holding certain kinds of memberships, we also 
want to investigate whether elites prefer the same types of associations as non-
elites do. 
Religion 
Religious denomination is a traditionally important variable which before 
1945 constituted a major line of social and political cleavage and is still today an 
important determinant of voting behavior. Its meaning has, however, changed 
since the foundation of the Federal Republic. The lessening of the numerical 
dominance of the Protestants who lived predominantly in the northern and the 
lost eastern parts of the former German Reich (1871: 62 percent)16 made it 
possible to found the interdenominational Christian Democratic Party as suc-
cessor of the former party of the Catholic minority, the Zentrum. This develop-
ment reflected a shift from the denominational cleavage to the new cleavage: 
Christian vs. laical (cf. Baker et al., 1981:180ff.). 
Regardless of the nurnerical shift of the two denominations, the old prepon-
derance of Protestants continues within the elites. This is particularly true for the 
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Elites, 1968 
Elites, 1972 
Elites, 1981 
Table 7. Development of the Proportions 
of Religious Denominations Over Time 
Ratio 01 
Percent Percent Catholies to 
ProtestaniS CathoUes Protestants 
56.6 27.3 48.2 
56.6 30.4 53.6 
52.\ 29.8 57.1 
General population, 1980 42.3 43.3 102.4 
Percent 
Without 
Religious 
Denomination 
14.7 
12.5 
\7.6 
14.0 
civil service, business, academic and military sectors. The reason for this lies 
mainly in the average lower education of the Catholic part of the population. 
This, in turn, has been explained by the continuing effect of the "Protestant 
ethic" as weil as the fact that Catholics live mainly in rural areas with fewer high 
school graduates (cf. Hoffmann-Lange et al., 1980:33). The Catholics, there-
fore, belong even today to those segments of the population disadvantaged by the 
educational system and underrepresented in the higher social strata: "The Ca-
tholics are confronted with the same basic barriers which all economically and 
socially disadvantaged groups are facing when they want their children to 
achieve a higher educationallevel" (Claessens et al., 1974:380). In this respect, 
our figures are a revealing illustration of the fact that the "Iaw of increasing 
disproportion" rnay affect the socia1 composition of elite groups long after the 
causes of the disadvantage have been eliminated. Compared to 1972, our data 
show no basic changes: the number of Catholics has grown in relation to the 
number of Protestants. This was, however, less the result of an increase in the 
number of Catholics than of the increase of respondents without any religious 
affiliation (Table 7). This increase of persons without religious denomination is, 
however, not a phenomenon limited to the elites. Among the population at large, 
church membership has also dropped from 94 percent in 1970 to less than 86 
percent in 1980,I1 Here, too, the decrease was primarily among Protestants. The 
proportion of Catholics and Protestants changed from 91.0 to 102.4 percent in 
favor of the Catholics. 
Within both the elites and the population, the rising proportion of persons 
without religious denomination is mainly a consequence of people deliberately 
leaving the church. Thus ,religious denomination, which used to be an ascriptive 
characteristic, becomes increasingly an indicator of individual value orientation. 
This becomes quite dear if we also consider the frequency of church attendance 
as a measure of religious ties. 
The figure in Tables 16 and 17 (presented later) show that today a combination 
of these two variables has an impact on party preference which is reflected in the 
high proportion of regular church attenders favoring the Christian Democrats. 
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In interpreting the figures, one has to bear in mind that even among church 
members, only minorities attend church regularly-namely, 29.1 percent of the 
elites and 32.4 percent of the population. Religious ties are therefore of central 
importance only for a minority, and they have also lost their relevance to social 
proximity among elites and population alike. 
Party Membership 
In 1979 4.3 percent of the West Gennan population were members of a 
political party.18 For the e1ites, the percentage is 10 times higher. It has in-
creased slightly from 40.0 to 43.4 percent since 1972. The figures for the 
different sectors have also remained rather stable. Among the elites of the civil 
service, the trade unions, and the broadcasting media, more than half of the 
respondents are party members (Table 8). The figures within the civil service 19 
and mass media20 sectors were broken down by subgroups primarily to show that 
party membership in these sectors is not only an expression of individual political 
orientation but is also influenced by the type of position and organization. 
Some 41.9 percentofparty members belong to the CDUtCSU, 47.7 percent to 
the SPD, and 10.3 percent to the FDP. These overall figures conceal, however, 
large differences between groups.21 Within the trade unions, for instance, 86.0 
percent of party members belong to the SPD. Among the civil service elites it is 
again necessary to differentiate according to position. Nearly 90 percent of the 
top state civil servants belong to government parties and more than 50 percent of 
the party members among the top federal civil servants are Social Democrats. 
Among the mass media elites, members of the SPD constitute only a minority of 
Table 8. Party Membership Among Civil Service, 
Mass Media, and Trade Union Elites 
Percentage 
01 Party Members 
1972 1981 
Civil service 
Fecleral polilkal civil 
servants 57.3 64.6 
Federal nonpolilical 
civil servants 32.8 44.7a 
Slale polilical civil 
servants 83.6 87.9 
Mass media 
Press 20.8 14.0 
Broadeasting media 51.1 53.7 
Trade unions 95.8 98.9 
aSee note 19. 
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the party members (39.2 percent) with little variation throughout the different 
media. These figures, too, show that membership in a certain party depends on 
the type of position held by a respondent. 
Trade Unions and Professional Associations 
Elites and nonelites differ considerably in their membership in occupational 
assodations (Table 9). Among elites (disregarding the business and trade union 
sectors ) the organization ratio in trade unions is lower than among the working 
population in general (26.5 percent as compared to 36.7 percent).22 We assume, 
however, that among the elites it is higher today than it was formerly, even 
though we have no figures from earlier elite studies. The general rise in organiza-
tion membership among white-collar employees, as weIl as the decline in hostile 
attitudes against trade unions among the new middle c1ass, support this assump-
tion. This trend is particularly strong among civil servants and journalists, who 
constitute two important groups of our elite sampie. 23 
On the other hand, membership in professional associations is significantly 
higher among elites than among the working population at large (30.2 percent as 
compared to about 9 percent).24 This is a logical consequence of the fact that, in 
contrast to the elites, only a small fraction of the population has professional 
training. 
Ifwe combine the figures forboth types ofassociations, however, elites do not 
differ from the working population: 50.5 percent of the elites and about 45 
percent of the working population are members of occupational associations.25 
Social Clubs and Student Fraternities 
In contrast to the associations discussed thus far, which were mass organiza-
tions where anyone can become a member, membership in social clubs and 
student fraternities is subject to certain preconditions. To enter student frater-
nities one must at least have been enrolled as a university student, and some 
fraternities even require references from one or more members. 
Tbe number of sodal clubs in Germany is much smalJer than in Anglo-Saxon 
countries and mostly limited to three major international associations: the Ro-
tary, the Lions, and the Freemasons. Admission to these associations is only 
possible after nomination by senior members and approval by the managing 
committee. The figures in Table 9 confirm the expectation that these clubs are, in 
fact, exclusive upper-class associations (cf. also Der Spiegel, 1983:63,66). 
While Social Democratic politicians and trade union leaders are rarely admitted, 
business leaders, academics, and the military establishment are overrepresented 
in these clubs. The association between social cJass background and membership 
is significant, though not very strong (Phi/Phimax = .18). We can therefore 
concJude that membership is more closely tied to the present position of the 
respondents than to their family background. 
Table 9. Membership in Voluntary Associations by Sector 
(percentages based on number of valid answers) 
Religion" 
No Religious Political Professional Student 
Catholics Protestants Affiliation Pardes rrade Unions Associations Social Clubs Fraternities 
Sector n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % 
Socia! Democratic 16 13.1 75 61.5 30 24.6 -...J> 106 85.5 25 20.2 9 7.3 3 2.4 
politicians (SPD) 
Christian Demo- 69 55.2 56 44.8 0 0.0 -...J> 22 17.6 54 43.2 38 30.4 28 22.4 
cratic politicians 
8j (CDU/CSU) 
Liberal politicians 4 16.0 19 76.0 2 8.0 -...J> 2 8.0 4 16.0 4 16.0 5 20.0 
(FDP) 
Civil service 83 28.1 177 60.0 34 11.5 199 67.7 66 22.3 74 25.0 51 17.2 61 20.6 
Business 98 34.6 134 47.3 50 17.7 81 28.6 35 12.3 56 19.6 114 40.0 55 19.3 
Business associa- 54 31.2 103 59.5 14 8.1 64 37.0 4 2.3 39 22.4 66 37.9 45 25.9 
tions 
Trade unions 23 26.4 25 28.7 39 44.8 86 98.9 -...J> 11 12.6 3 3.4 1.1 
Mass media 76 34.5 92 41.8 51 23.2 74 33.5 46 20.7 78 35.1 54 24.3 16 7.2 
Academic 36 27.9 74 57.4 18 14.0 24 18.6 10 7.7 58 44.6 41 31.5 19 14.6 
Military 9 20.9 30 69.8 3 7.0 6 14.6 2.3 29 67.4 21 48.8 7 16.3 
Cultural 15 14.6 40 38.8 47 45.6 22 21.4 29 27.9 33 31.7 10 9.6 0 0.0 
Other 33 25.6 78 60.5 18 14.0 ..11. 60.2 .J2 27.1 .M 51.2 ..1! 24.0 16 12.4 
Total 516 29.8 903 52.1 306 17.6 633 43.4 356 21.6 527 30.2 442 25.3 256 14.7 
aBecause of srnall numbers, membership in other religious denominations is not reported. 
blmplied by position. 
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Altogether the size of the membership figures does not eonfirm the idea of an 
"elite within the elites." We agree with Dye's conclusion that sueh associations 
"provide an opportunity for informal interaction among elites in different seg-
ments of society" (1983:214) and that membership in them is more a conse-
quenee than a precondition of aleadership position. 26 
The assumption that many key decisions of an industrial nation are made in 
such clubs is misleading since the political seetor is underrepresented among 
their members. This is true for the Federal Republic as weil as for the United 
States, even though a much higher proportion of American elites are club mem-
bers. "The fact that a majority of top govemmental and military elites are not 
club members undercuts the importance attributed to club membership by many 
'power elite' writers" (Dye, 1983:216).27 One has also to bear in mind that 
Rotary and Lions Clubs, for example, are competitive organizations as far as 
membership is concemed. 
The function of social clubs is, therefore, more of a private than of an instru-
mental nature. Membership in such clubs, similar to possessing an upper-class 
background, may be helpful in furthering one's own interests by providing 
personal connections. Members of these clubs do not, however, constitute a 
"ruling c1ass." "Personal interaction, consensus building, and friendship net-
works all develop in the club milieu, but the clubs help facilitate processes that 
occur anyway" (Dye, 1983:216). 
Since there are no prestige universities in Germany where future elites can 
meet at an early stage of their careers, student fratemities used to play that sort of 
role. This is, however, no longer the ease because at the end ofWorld War II the 
fratemities were discredited as a result of their collaboration with the Nazi 
regime. Since then, the membership of the traditional duelling fratemities has 
decreased and given way to the joining of more modem clubs devoted primarily 
to sociallife: 14.7 percent of all elites and 21.5 percent of the respondents who 
studied at a university reported membership in a fratemity. The arguments made 
for social clubs also apply to student fratemities: they may be of instrumental 
value to the individual member, yet the total membership numbers are too small 
to contribute much to elite integration or to the bolstering of an elite eulture. 
To summarize, the analysis of membership in voluntary associations revealed 
no evidence of such organizations contributing to elite integration. Compared to 
the population at large, elites are more frequently Protestants and members of 
political parties, professional associations, and social clubs. This, however, does 
not lead to the deveJopment of a common interest, particularly since membership 
is split between competing organizations. We eontend that the memberships 
analyzed can be more accurately understood as indicators of social value orienta-
tions, as was the case for membership in religious denominations. Trade union 
members and persons without religious denomination are presumably more fa-
vorable to reform, while members of professional organizations, socia! clubs, 
and student fratemities have a more conservative outlook. Later, we will analyze 
how these basic orientations correspond to party lines. 
Elite Integration in West Germany 
Regional Concentration, Informal Elite Integration, 
and Elite Culture 
65 
Regional concentration provides opportunities for coordination among elites 
of different sectors by enabling regular informal contacts reaching beyond the 
immediate occupational environment. Empirical evidence indicates the impor-
tance of informal social relations for integration among local elites. 28 In a similar 
fashion, the existence of anational capital could provide a center for the develop-
ment of an informal national elite circle. It has frequently been argued that in 
England and France, for instance, elite members of different sectors meet regu-
lady at social occasions and thus foster the development of a specific "elite 
culture." In order to discuss this argument properly, we have first to distinguish 
this concept of elite culture from informal intluence on politica! decisions. The 
latter takes place primarily within a circle of persons tied by a common interest or 
ideology. In an era of telephones and airplanes, it no longer depends on regular 
physical contact. 
An elite culture, instead, requires occupational and political-ideologica! het-
erogeneity and regional concentration at the same time. In a recently published 
article with the revealing title "The Unsociable Creme," the journalist Hans 
Otto Eglau, deploring the lack of informal social relations among West German 
elites, outlines the function of such contacts: "Socia! relations on a high intellec-
tuallevel by themselves ... do not solve problems nor do they enable a balance 
of interests. Nevertheless, they foster a milieu which, regardless of separate 
interests, facilitates an understanding of common goals and tasks and sharpens 
the sense for what is feasible" (1983:35). 
The absence of a real national capital in the Federal Republic, however, 
impedes the development of informal elite circles in the above sense. Bonn and 
its environs, including Cologne, one of the biggest German cities with more than 
500,000 inhabitants, could not take over the function of a capital primarily 
because a considerable number of the relevant organizations do not have a place 
of residence there. Hamburg has become a center for the media sector, and 
Frankfurt a business center. The headquarters of the trade unions are dispersed 
among a number of larger cities such as Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, and 
Stuttgart-and only liaison offices are maintained in Bonn. Thus, aside from the 
federal political institutions, only the business associations have their headquar-
ters in the Bonn area. 
An informal elite circle in Bonn would therefore be limited from the beginning 
to the sectors of politics, the civil service, and business associations. This limita-
tion becomes even more pronounced if we also take into consideration that many 
members of tbese sectors do not have their hornes in the Bonn area. Many of 
them keep their private residences in other places even when they take a position 
in a federal organization located in Bonn or Cologne. "German top managers are 
glad if they can catch the last plane after a talk to the minister or an official 
reception," Eglau complains, noting that none of the multinationally active 
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German corporations maintains a guest house in Bonn where informal social 
gatherings of political and business leaders might take place (1983:32). 
A similar argument applies to federal politicians. Even those who have been 
engaged in federal politics for a long time usually maintain their private resi-
dences far from Bonn and commute on weekends (Eglau, 1983:32). This is a 
rational strategy since they normally depend on local support for reelection. 
Thus, among the nearly 30 percent of the elite respondents whose organizations 
are based in or near Bonn, only two-thirds also have their private residence in 
this area. Those who do so usually have permanent positions; mostly as civil 
servants in the ministerial bureaucracy: 81.9 percent of these civil servants, in 
contrast to only 3.3 percent of the federal politicians and 28.2 percent of the top 
business association leaders, reported a private residence in the Bonn area. This 
does not preclude, however, informal contacts on weekdays, but these are pre-
sumably restricted to persons sharing the immediate occupational environment. 
The short periods of presence lead to a steady pressure to attend to business 
appointments and prec1ude the openness to questions not of immediate concem, 
which, in turn, is a precondition for informal contacts with persons in other 
sectors. 
Given the absence of areal federal capital, one could ask if the state capitals 
fulfill a comparable function for the individual states. Here, again, a similar 
picture of regional decentralization emerges. Only in the small states are private 
residences concentrated near the state capitals, which is, however, a trivial 
finding. The more important larger states, i.e., North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Baden-Württemberg, and Bavaria, however, have several subcenters where the 
private residences of the elites are scattered across the whole state. 
In short, elites in the Federal Republic are decentralized. We could not detect a 
single national center where something Iike an "establishment" (in the Ameri-
can sense) could develop. There are some regional centers aside from Bonn-the 
Rhein-Main region, the Ruhr area, and Hamburg-but they are Iimited to mem-
bers of regional elites or to specific sectors and thus cannot contribute to a 
national and truly intersectoral elite integration. According to Eglau, only in the 
Hanseatic towns of Hamburg and Bremen is there something like an elite culture 
which encompasses not only members of different sectors but also representa-
tives of different parties (1983:35). 
Given the technical complexity of the decisions elites are facing today, it is, 
however, open to debate whether an elite culture of this sort would be likely to 
fulfill the function often ascribed to it. Shils, who concedes that it might promote 
"wisdom and good judgment," nevertheless doubts that such a culture could 
impart the technical and scientific knowledge modem elites need (1982:26). 
Moreover, the concept of an elite culture implies that leadership qualifications 
and good judgment can only be acquired by talking to other elites. It thus 
assumes that nonelites differ qualitatively from elites with regard to their level of 
information and their qualifications for judging current events. Given the average 
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high educationallevel and the universal spread of mass media information, this 
is, however, no longer true. Thus, the decline of elite culture may in part be 
caused by the fact that the elites themselves no longer attach great value to it, 
which means that it has lost its function for elite integration. 
PROFESSIONAL RECRUITMENT AND POSITION 
INTERLOCKS: 
EXPERTISE VS. AMATEUR POWER 
In this section, we shall analyze specialization as weil as position interlocks 
between sectors. Interlocks may be synchronous or diachronous [concurrent vs. 
revolving interlocks (cf. Salzmann and Domhoff, 1980:251)].29 Both kinds of 
interlocks are widely assumed to contribute to the exchange of information and 
thereby the coordination among elites. Following the life cycle of the re-
spondents, we will start with an analysis of career patterns. 
Professional Training 
Up to now, we have commented rather brieflyon the level of formal schooling 
our respondents have received. We found that the overwhelming majority of the 
elites completed a high school degree (Abitur). Nearly 70 percent have a univer-
sity degree. This means that a college degree is a nearly universal precondition 
for recruitment to elite positions. We will now analyze the level, as weil as the 
content of, the elites' education in somewhat more detail. 
It has already been said that Social Oemocratic politicians and trade union 
leaders have, on average, less formal education than other elite respondents. A 
long-term analysis shows, however, that the average level of education has risen 
among Social Oemocratic politicians whereas it has remained fairly constant 
among trade union leaders. 30 The proportion of respondents with a university 
degree rose in the first group from 46.2 to 55.4 percent from 1972 to 1981. In the 
trade unions, instead, it remained as low as 8 percent in 1981. 
Oue to the different educational systems, comparisons among countries are 
always somewhat problematic. Nevertheless, the results of Oye (1983:196), 
Barton (1974), and Pakulski (1982:56) allow the rough conclusion that elites in 
the United States and Australia possess similar advanced educational 
backgrounds. 
In contrast to a college degree, the Abitur in Germany has never been a self-
contained educational degree but only an entrance ticket to the university. Most 
high school graduates continue their education at a university. Qnly a small 
proportion proceeds directly to on-the-job training. 31 Among elites, however, 
two groups can be found in which most respondents completed high school but a 
much smaller proportion went on to acquire a university degree. These are the 
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mass media and the military seetors. But whereas the military offers its appli-
cants professional on-the-job training, this is not true for the mass media, where 
less than half ofthe respondents (47.3 percent) have a university degree. Another 
31.7 percent enrolled at a university but did not finish their studies and reported 
no other formal professional training; 7.7 percent finally completed high school 
and the follow-up on-the-job training which is offered by most daily news-
papers.32 This peculiar educational pattern of mass media elites was also found 
in the previous elite surveys of 1968 and 1972 and is known to be typical for 
West German journalists in general (cf. Enke, 1974:91; Hoffmann-Lange et al., 
1980:27ff.; Zimmer, 1982:30ff.). 
While high schools offer a rather broad and unspecialized curriculum and the 
large number of respondents with a high school degree means that nearly all 
members of the elites have received such a general intellectual training, univer-
sity studies usually provide more speeialized knowledge. The ehoice of a speeifie 
field of university studies, therefore, sets the course for the future eareef of a 
person. Comparing the faculties at whieh the respondents of the different sectors 
most often studied, we can see that law studies lead most often to political Of 
civil service eareers: 49.5 percent of the politicians and 70.0 percent of the civil 
service elites with a university education have studied law. 
Among the business elites, instead, the number of lawyers and economists 
(eaeh with 33.2 percent) are nearly balaneed. The natural scienees and engineer-
ing constitute a third field mentioned rather frequently by business elites (19.5 
percent). It seems plausible that eaeh of these three faeulties provides the knowl-
edge needed in business enterprises or business associations. 
On the other hand, a plurality of respondents in the mass media and in the 
eultura! sector mentioned soda! scienees and the humanities as the fields of their 
university studies (42.0 pereent in the mass media and 57.3 percent in the 
eultural seetor). In the aeademie sector representatives of the natural sciences and 
engineering are predominant (41.7 percent). This reflects the fact that research 
funding priorities of the West German government favor teehnological research. 
The differences found between sectors indicate that specific knowledge is not 
only important for entrance into a certain seetor but that it continues to be 
important during the later stages of a career. One has to bear in mind, however, 
that no single field dominates any seetor. Even in the civil service, which is most 
homogeneous in this respect, only two-thirds of the respondents have completed 
a law degree. 
Several authors have pointed out the importance of law studies for elite recruit-
ment in Germany (Dahrendorf, 1965a:260ff.; von Beyme, 1971:55f; Wilden-
mann, 1982:9). Tbe majority of elites are indeed lawyers: 39.2 percent of all 
respondents who studied at a university and 29.7 percent of elite respondents 
studied law.33 The proportion has decreased, however, since 1972 by a margin 
of nearly 10 percent. 
Dahrendorf assumed that the high proportion of lawyers among German elites 
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is of considerable importance for elite integration. The law faculties, in his 
opinion, are the only institutions where a significant section of the German 
political class spend part of their lives together (1965a:275). Wildenmann 
stresses the fact that "about two percent of the university teachers educate one-
third of the future positional elite" (1982:9). 
According to Dahrendorf, the integrative effeet of law studies is brought about 
by two mechanisms: seleetion and socialization. Our data confirm that re-
spondents who have studied law do indeed differ from other university graduates 
in therr family backgrounds (Table 10): a disproportionate number had fathers 
who were either self-employed or eivil servants (cf. Dahrendorf, I 965a:26O, 
270). However, the association is not very strong. 
The socializing effect of law studies consists, according to Dahrendorf, in a 
specific approach to problem solving taught at the law faculties. Since this is 
independent of the subject itself, he characterized lawyers as "specialists for the 
general" (1965a:264). He adds the assumption that the study of law imparts 
general leadership qualifieations (1965a:265). One should therefore expect to 
find relatively more lawyers in the highest positions of a society. Within the elite 
sampie we could, however, not find support for this assumption. Respondents in 
the very top positions did not differ from those in other elite positions in the 
number of former law students. Our data do not allow us to determine whether 
this is due to the fact that specialized knowledge is more important today, even 
for elites, or rather that all elite positions included in our sampie are located at 
such a high level that the two parts of our sampie do not differ with regard to the 
amount of leadership qualification required. The decreasing number of lawyers 
within the elite supports the first assumption without invalidating the second. 
We could also not eonfirm a second soeializing effeet postulated by Dahren-
dorf, namely, a conservative orientation among lawyers. At least we could find 
no significant difference between respondents from law faculties and those grad-
Table 10. Association Between Father's Occupational Status 
and Law Studiesa 
F ather' s Occupational 
Law Studies Other F aculties 
Status n % n % 
Employerlself-employed 128 38.9 201 61.1 
Civil Service: 
Lower civil service 112 44.4 140 55.6 
Higher civi! service 127 50.4 125 49.6 
White-coUar emp10yees 87 30.1 202 69.9 
Blue-coUar workers J1 23.9 .21 16.1 
Total 471 39.5 722 60.5 
4p = 0.00; Cramer's V = .17. 
Total 
n 
329 
252 
252 
289 
--.l! 
1193 
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uated from other faculties concerning party preferences (p = .99). It even trans-
pired that among university graduates the number of respondents with a prefer-
ence for the Social Democrats is above average among lawyers (24.7 percent). 
Only respondents who studied the social sciences and the humanities express a 
higher rate of sympathy for the Social Democratic Party. This is, of course, no 
direct disconfirmation of Dahrendorfs contention, but it does show that this 
thesis does not apply to one of the most politically relevant attitudes. Arecent 
survey among young lawyers who were compared to a control group of other 
students also showed that the former were not more conservative than the latter 
with reference to a wide range of political attitudes (cf. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
May 8, 1982). Thus, Dahrendorf's assumptions about the role of lawyers in 
German society need to be qualified in the light of more recent research results. 
Tbis is particularly true for the assumed numerical dominance of lawyers among 
West German elites. In a11 elite sectors, except for the political-administrative 
ones, less than one-third of the respondents are lawyers. This is also true for the 
business elites where lawyers used to play a prominent role (Dahrendorf, 
1965a:263, Hoffmann-Lange et a1. , 1980:30). 
On the other hand, 33.6 percent of the politicians and 66.7 percent of the civil 
servants in the sampie have studied law. Since legal knowledge is important in 
the legislative process, this seems justified for technical reasons. Because of the 
increasing complexity of the legislative process one could claim that law studies 
qualify a person as a law maker. We can even draw the speculative conclusion 
that the law has lost its function as a general intellectual training and (re )gained 
the status of a specialized training in legal matters. If this is true, legal education 
will continue to lose its importance for elite integration and will instead contrib-
ute to a differentiation between elite sectors. But, independent of this develop-
ment, the differences in social background and party preferences between law-
yers and other university graduates were too small to support the contention that 
lawyers form a homogeneous elite circle in West Germany. 
Career Patterns 
Tbe careers of eHtes are important for two reasons. First, many authors have 
discussed the fact that the different elite sectors are characterized by an increas-
ing differentiation in careers, which, in turn, leads to an increasing demand for 
coordination (e.g., Keller, Dahrendorf, Scheueh). On the other hand, the ques-
tion arises whether career experiences have an impact on elite attitudes. We shall 
investigate this question in a later section. 
With regard to elite integration, the intersectoral differentiation of career pat-
terns is of special importance. Internal homogeneity of careers in combination 
with differences between sectors indicate that specialized knowledge is more 
important than generalist leadership qualifications. While this has always been 
true for the civil service and academic eHtes, recent studies have shown that even 
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the political sector which had long been the provinee of the "Iay politician" 
displays a growing tendeney to "earreerization and professionalization". 34 
Given the heterogeneity of the elite sampIe studied, it was impossible to get 
detailed information on the eareers of the respondents in the eontext of a strue-
tured interview. To do this, it would have been neeessary to obtain not only 
precise information eoneerning their main oceupational aetivities but also about 
many relevant honorary offices held during their eareers. In order to study 
differences in eareer patterns it was, however, enough to ask for the number of 
years the respondents had spent full time in different sectors. For reasons of 
standardization, respondents were asked to use a given list of seetors. 
The figures in Table 11 were eomputed on the basis of this information. It 
was, however, neeessary to exelude the respondents of a number of subgroups 
whose eareers deviated systematieally from the other respondents in a given 
sector: 
• Business assoeiations seetor-officials of agricultural associations (n = 
37) 
• Aeademie sector-respondents working in research branehes of large in-
dustrial eompanies (n = 19) 
• Cultural seetor-publishers (n = 49)35 
In addition, respondents of the residual group "others" (n = 129) were not 
analyzed beeause of their heterogeneity. Respondents were also excluded who 
displayed individual differenees between our sector classifieation of the main 
position of the respondent and the one used by the respondent himself for his 
present sector. These ineonsistencies mainly pertained to persons who simul-
taneously held positions in several sectors and differed in their subjeetive classi-
fieation of whieh of these positions was the main one. Such ineonsistencies were 
especially frequent among members of business associations who c1aimed the 
sector business eorporations as their present seetor. Sinee many positions in 
business associations are, in fact, held by managers of business eorporations or 
by entrepreneurs, we eould not c1assify this sort of deviation as individual ineon-
sisteney. At the same time the corpora te positions of these persons were, aeeord-
ing to our eriteria, of minor importanee and did not belong to the sector eategory 
which eomprised only the top position holders in the biggest eorporations. We 
deeided, therefore, to keep these respondents as aseparate group; this also 
enabled us to look for possible differences between these two groups of 
managers. 
Due to the exclusions mentioned, the analyses of eareer patterns are based on 
the answers of 1426 respondents. Altogether, 234 respondents were excluded 
beeause of their group membership and another 83 because of individual incon-
sistencies in sector classifieation.36 Respondents in the political sector were 
Table 11. Careers 
Number anti 
Percentage Number anti 
First SectoT Percentage 
MeanAge at Mean Identical with Whole Career 
Time 0/ Mean Years Presenl in Present 
Entry into Years in in Percentage 0/ Who/e SeeloT SeelOT 
Mean Occupational Present Present Career Spent in Mean Number 
SeeloT Age Career Position Seclar Present SeeloT 0/ Sectors 0 % 0 % 
Polilics 
(0 = 237) 49.6 24.8 3.9 12.2 51.6 2.3 15 6.3 10 4.2 
Civil service 
(0 = 293) 53.1 28.0 5.1 22.4 90.2 1.7 128 43.7 113 38.6 
Business 
(0 = 261) 54.2 24.8 7.1 26.3 90.7 1.4 196 75.1 176 66.7 
Business associa-
tj lions, but main 
position in busi-
ness (n = 63) 58.1 25.8 5.7 31.4 97.9 1.3 55 87.3 46 73.0 
Business associa-
lions (0 = 70) 53.0 26.7 8.0 18.6 72.7 2.0 18a 25.7 17 24.3 
Trade unions 
(n = 82) 54.3 18.9 8.7 25.8 73.2 2.1 3 3.7 2 2.4 
Mass media 
(0 = 108) 51.8 25.0 8.0 26.5 99.1 1.4 164 75.2 151 69.3 
Academic 
(0 = 108) 51.0 27.1 5.7 21.7 90.5 1.5 77 71.3 60 55.6 
Military 
(n = 42) 54.8 22.0 2.0 28.1 88.0 2.0 27 64.3 8 19.0 
Cultural 
(mass media) 
(0 = 52) 47.5 24.7 7.6 21.5 96.5 .!2 ..11 63.5 ..l2 55.8 
Total 52.5 25.4 6.1 22.6 83.9 1.7 716 50.2 610 42.8 
tJAnother 23 (32.9%) respondents of this group named business as their ftrst sector. Thus. altogether. 58.6% of this group started their careers in the economic sector. 
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analyzed together sinee we were primarily interested in the differenees between 
politieians and respondents in other sectors for whieh party membership is only 
of seeondary importanee. 
Typically, an elite position in the Federal Republie is reaehed after a rather 
long eareer. The respondents were, on average, nearly 47 years old and had 
pursued a eareer of nearly 21 years when they entered their present position. 
Sinee the data did not allow us to deeide whether the present position was the 
first elite position of a respondent, we used the panel information in our data in 
order to determine the age at whieh persons in the Federal Republie normally 
first enter elite positions. This was done by excluding those respondents from the 
anl!lysis who had already been registered as elite position holders in the 1972 
elite survey as well as all respondents in the eultural sector who had not been 
included in that previous study. We ean assume that for most of the other 
respondents their present position, whieh they had generally oceupied for six 
years, was their first elite position. 
The flgures were not ehanged very mueh by these exclusions. The remaining 
respondents, too, had first entered their elite position at a mean age of 46 years. 
Table 11 shows only minoe interseetoral differences in the duration of elite 
eareers exeept for the military elites, who obviously needed longer to reaeh the 
top and were usually about 52 years old when they entered their present position. 
The results eoneeming the sectors in whieh the respondents had been aetive 
during their eareers support the assumption of a trend toward a differentiation of 
eareers between seetors. This trend is less obvious if we look only at the number 
of respondents with an exclusively intraseetoral eareer. Instead, these flgures 
allow identifleation of those seetors whieh do not yet offer full-time eareer 
opportunities beeause they are usually entered as a full-time oceupation only 
after a respondent has spent time in honorary offices in that sector. These are 
business associations, trade unions, and polities. 
In our opinion, two further measurements are suitable as evidenee of the eareer 
autonomy of seetors: the number of years a respondent has spent without inter-
ruption in his present seetor , and the pereentage of his whole eareer spent in the 
present seetor. The figures show that only the politieal sector differs from others 
in this respect. Politicians have generally spent only somewhat more than half of 
their eareers as full-time politicians, whieh is equivalent to a mean of 12 years. 
They most often mentioned the civil service (40.5 percent), business enterprises 
(27.4 percent), scienee, and higheredueation (30.4 percent) as former seetors.37 
This pieture of the relatively high eareer autonomy of the individual sectors 
beeomes even elearer if one looks at the pereentages instead of the means: 82.7 
percent of the respondents have been in their present seetor for more than 10 
years and only 7 percent for less than 6 years. Even in the politieal sector, 
somewhat less than 19 percent of the respondents have been professional politi-
cians for less than 6 years. 
Our data also give evidenee that intersectoral elite cireulation is rather low in 
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the Federal Republic. 38 Even if nearly 60 percent of the elites can look back on 
occupational experience in at least one other sector , this usually dates to a rather 
early period in their careers and can therefore not be regarded as a contribution to 
elite integration. In our opinion, change from one sector to another, in order to 
have an integrative effect, must occur at a relatively late stage of a career because 
it then presupposes insight into the decision-making structures and personal 
acquaintance with important persons in that sector. Therefore, we cannot assurne 
that the former employment in business enterprises which was mentioned by 76 
percent of the trade union leaders contributes to elite integration since it normally 
mealis only that these persons performed subordinate functions at the beginning 
of their careers. 
Our data, however, do not allow us to concJude that interchangeability of 
positions is always low. Patterns of elite circulation, instead, seem to be strnngly 
influenced by cultural norms. In the United States and Canada, for instance, in 
spite of a rather similar socioeconomic structure, elite circulation is quite com-
mon, particularly between politics and economics, while intrasectoral careers 
prevail in Europe (Pakulski, 1982: 188ff.). This difference in patterns might be 
an explanation of the much higher emphasis placed by American authors on the 
importance of elite circulation for elite integration (e.g., Salzman and Domhoff, 
1980). 
Position Interlocks 
Tbe study of position interlocks, particularly research on interlocking directo-
rates is a frequent way of studying elite integration. Interlocks between organiza-
tions have been interpreted either as means of coordination or of control (Palmer, 
1983:41). Advocates of the power elite theory have tended to stress the control 
aspect which, however, assurnes that it is possible to determine the direction of 
the control relationship, i.e., the unequivocal determination of the main position 
of a certain respondent. 
We started by analyzing interlocks among the different elite positions in our 
gross sample of elite positions. Altogetber, 3580 positions were identified as 
elite positions. Of these, 3531 had an incumbent at the time of the survey and 
were held by 3165 different persons. Of these 3165 incumbents of elite positions, 
91.3 percent held only one elite position; 18.2 percent of the positions were 
interlocked with other positions. The proportion of persons holding more than 
one position at the same time was 8.7 percent, but no more than 2 percent held 
more than two or up to six elite positions (Table 12). The proportion ofinterlock-
ing positions is considerably smaller than in the United States, where (according 
to Dye's results) 68.1 percent ofthe positions are interlocked and 15.0 percent of 
the incumbents of these positions hold more than one position at the same time 
(Dye, 1983:171). However, the difference is partially a consequence of the 
Elite Integration in West Germany 75 
Table 12. Interloeking Elite Positions 
Positions Position Holders 
n % n % 
Total 3531 100.0 3165 100.0 
One position 2889 81.8 2889 91.3 
Two positions 426 12.1 213 6.7 
More than two 216 6.1 63 2.0 
positions 
criteria Dye used to seleet elite positions. In the academic seetor, for example, 
Dye included not only aeademies but members of the boards of trustees of 
universities (which are normally made up of persons having their main position 
in other seetors ). 
The 642 position interloeks in our sampIe resulted in 497 eombinations of two 
interlocking positions. More than half of these (53.1 percent) were eombinations 
within the eeonomic seetor (business and business associations), 14.3 pereent 
oceurred within the politieal seetor and another 8.9 pereent were other intrasee-
toral eombinations. Thus only 23.7 pereent of the eombinations were intersec-
toral. The first two eolumns of Table 13 show the eorresponding figures for the 
elite persons in the different seetors. Only 2.9 pereent ofthe elite persons had an 
additional elite position in another seetoT. 
Salzman and Domhoff have, however, objeeted that his kind of reasoning 
underestimates the real number of interloeks for two reasons. In the first in-
stanee, they eritieize its use of a micro-perspeetive. Their reanalysis of Dye's 
data for the business seetor in the aggregate showed thaI the number of eorpora-
tions with ties 10 at least one other eorporation in the sampIe was mueh higher: 
190 of 201 eorporations in the sampIe were interloeked (1980:233). Sinee the 
number of eorporations is mueh smaller than the number of positions, an analo-
gous eomputation for our data also led to a higher density of interloeks within the 
business sector: 132 positional interloeks among 229 eorporations. Even though 
this is a somewhat lower density than that which Salzman and Domhoff found, it 
suggests a rather high overall rate of interlocks sinee nearly 60 pereent of the 
eorporations are involved. 
If this number is, however, not related to the number of eorporations but to the 
maximum possible number of links between these eorporations, the proportion of 
links is only half a pereent. ThaI means that it is possible to ehange the relational 
numbers dramatically by changing the point of referenee. But the latter figure 
does, in turn, underestimate the actual extent of intereorporate links sinee our 
sampIe is Iimited to the holders of top positions in these eorporations. A study of 
interlocking direetorates among the 259 biggest independent German business 
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Table 13. Interlocking Positions 
Olher Elite 
Posidon in 
Same 
Sector' 
Other 
Elite 
Position 
in Olher 
SectorsG 
Socia! Democratic 
politicians (SPD) 
Christian Democratic 
politicians 
(CDUtCSU) 
Liberal politicians 
74 16.4 30 6.6 
(FDP) 
Civil service 
Business 
Business associations 
Tradc unions 
Mass media 
Academic 
Military 
4 0.8 
~O 7.3 
47 1~.9 
o 0.0 
14 4.0 
3 1.7 
o 0.0 
1.7 
29 4.2 
7 2.4 
13 8.4 
3 0.8 
o 0.0 
o 0.0 
Culh1ra1 3 1.7 o 0.0 
...! 0.1 
9II 2.9 
Other .-.! M 
Total 199'" 6.3 
Socia! Democratic 
Member 
of 
Control 
Board of 
Brood-
cllSI;ng 
Networks 
politicians (SPD) 16 12.9 
Christian Democratic 
politicians 
(CDUICSU) 12 9.6 
Liberal politicians 
(FDP) 6 24.0 
Civil service 22 7.4 
Business 0.4 
Business associations 4 2.3 
Trade unions 9 10.3 
Position in 
Political 
Parties 
105 84.7 
103 82.4 
24 96.0 
33 11.1 
11 3.9 
14 8.0 
18 20.7 
Member in 
Policy 
Advisory 
Commiueeb 
9 
9 
4 
23 
24 
24 
11 
7 
38 
I 
2 
..ll 
172 
7.3 
7.2 
16.0 
7.8 
8.4 
13.8 
19.~ 
3.2 
29.2 
2.3 
1.9 
10.9 
9.9 
Member 
in 
Advisory 
Comm;t-
lee 10 
Federal 
Minis"ies 
of 
Finance 
und Eco-
nomies 
4 3.2 
2 
4 
I~ 
10 
4 
o 
7 
o 
o 
~ 
~8 
4.0 
8.0 
1.4 
~.3 
~.7 
4.6 
0.0 
~.4 
0.0 
0.0 
S.4 
3.3 
Member in 
Advisory 
Commiuee 
10 F edera/ Member of 
Ministries 
of 
Education 
and 
Research 
o 
7 
~ 
6 
9 
S 
29 
o 
o 
...! 
64 
0.8 
0.8 
0.0 
2.4 
1.8 
3.4 
10.3 
2.3 
22.3 
0.0 
0.0 
....M 
3.7 
Control 
Board in 
Business 
Corpor-
alion 
3 
6 
o 
3 
30 
2 
16 
o 
2 
o 
o 
..Q 
62 
2.4 
4.8 
0.0 
1.0 
10.~ 
1.1 
18.4 
0.0 
1.5 
0.0 
0.0 
...Q,Q 
3.6 
Position in 
Member 0/ 
a Leg/s-
latureC 
42 33.9 
~9 47.2 
12 48.0 
4 1.4 
6 2.1 
16 9.2 
I~ 17.2 
Position 
in Trade 
Unions 
2 1.6 
4 3.2 
o 0.0 
2 0.7 
12 4.2 
3 1.7 
--" 
Profes· position in 
sional 
Associa-
l;ons 
4 
9 
o 
9 
35 
2S 
9 
3.2 
7.2 
0.0 
3.0 
12.3 
14.4 
10.3 
Business 
Associa-
l;ons 
2 1.6 
I~ 12.0 
~ 20.0 
4 1.4 
133 46.7 
--" 
1.1 
TOlal 
124 
125 
25 
296 
28~ 
174 
87 
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Table 13. (C ontinued) 
Member 
01 
Contral Position in 
B'oard of Profes- Position in 
Broad- Position in Member 0/ Position sional Business 
ca.f/ing Polüical a Legis- in Trade Associa- Associa-
Nerworb Parties /Olurec Unions I;ons tions Total 
Mass media 9 4.1 5 2.3 3 1.4 6 2.7 10 4.5 6 2.7 222 
Academic 4 3.1 2 r.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 17 13.1 6 4.6 130 
Military 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 9.3 0 0.0 43 
Culnual 2.9 1.0 1.0 6 5.8 11 10.6 9 8.7 104 
Other -.l ..H ..l§. 12.4 ..l1 LU ..1 M ...,ßt' 32.6 ..l§. ru ...m 
Total 93 5.3 332 19.0 175 10.0 37 2.2 175 10.0 197 12.5 1744 
QAll holders of elite positions. 
blncluding membership in all kinds oE advisory commitrees Co federaJ ministries. 
t'lncluding membership in the Bundestag. State Legislatures. the European Parliament. or a local legislature. 
dlmpJied by position. 
"Thirty-five of these respondents have heen interviewed because they hold elite positions in professional associa-
eions, 
'Fourteen persons have interlocking positions in the same and in other sectors, Therefore, the eota! number of 
persons with interlocking positions (n == 276) is less than the sum of ehe column tocals. 
corporations showed that, altogether, 4 percent of all possible pairs of corpora-
tions were linked by personal ties and one-half percent by assets (Biehler, 
1982:86). 
In the context of our analysis, however, intersectoral links are of greater 
importance than intrasectoral ones. These are, as the figures in Table 13 show, 
much less frequent. The trade union leaders, in this respect, contribute most to 
intersectoral elite integration: 8.4 percent of them have at least one other elite 
position in a different sector, compared to 6.6 percent of the politicians and 4.2 
percent of the business managers. Tbe position interlocks of the latter can, 
however, hardly be qualified as truly intersectoral because most of them concem 
additional positions in business associations. 
Tbe second objection of Salzman and Domhoff against Dye's analysis and in 
general against the study of interlocking elite positions is that such an approach 
ignores relationships on lower organizationallevels (1980:240ff.). Here again, 
we can provide some information from our study. We have systematically in-
c1uded information on the membership of the respondents in a number of pre-
defined bodies such as legislatures, state or federal party committees, control 
boards of the broadcasting networks, and advisory committees to federal minis-
tries. This information was gathered by looking up the positions in directories. 
They are thus complete where these bodies are concerned. In addition, in the 
course of the interviews respondents were asked about additional positions they 
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held in trade unions as weil as professional and business associations at the state 
or federal level. In analyzing these positions, naturally we have not collected 
information on all positions of the respondents but, at least, on those which 
might be of greatest importance for intersectoral elite coordination. The control 
boards of the broadcasting networks and the advisory committees are, indeed, 
exclusively made up of persons from other sectors. 
Looking at Table 13, one can again see that trade union leaders and politicians 
are most active intersectorally, while business leaders limit their scope to busi-
ness and professional associations. The figures, however, underestimate the 
actual extent of intersectoral position interlocks since only membership in a 
number of predefined bodies has been considered. An open-ended question 
included in the 1972 elite survey elicited a much higher amount of multiple 
position holding: 54.2 percent of the politicians and 45 percent of the top civil 
servants named at least one position in another sector (Neumann, 1979:101, 
108). These were board memberships in business enterprises and positions in 
religious and charitable associations, in educational institutions, and on the 
boards of local research foundations (cf. also Hoffmann-Lange et a!., 
1980:73).39 Higley et al. report an even higher amount of interlocking positions: 
62 percent of the Australian elite respondents held additional positions in another 
sector (1979:72). 
How do we interpret these results? Obviously, this depends primarily on the 
choice of a point of reference. Relating the number of position interlocks to the 
number of organizations involved indicates extensive intersectoral relations; re-
lating them to the number of possible links makes them appear rather modest. If 
we choose the perspective of network literature which stresses the integrative 
importance of indirect ties (e.g., Kadushin, 1968), we may conclude that the 
number of intersectoral positionallinks found in the data are sufficient to ensure 
institutionalized intersectoral coordination. This is particularly true since it is 
supplemented by other role-related contacts. 
Tbe concept of social circles which interprets indirect ties as promoting elite 
integration is, however, not suitable for measuring power in the sense of contro!. 
Tbus, according to Kadushin, the function of social circles does not consist in the 
exertion of control but rather in the promotion of common interests. A social circle 
has no leaders and no clearly defined goals (1968:692). Control, rather, can only 
be exerted by a direct relationship between two organizations. If corporation A has 
a member on the board of corporation Band B, in turn, has a link to C, this does 
not mean that A controls C. Palmer even concludes, on the basis of his data on 
interlocking directorates, that not even the direction of interlocks allows determin-
ation of the direction in which power is exerted (1983:53). This means that the 
intersectoral links provided by multiple position holding serve the purpose of 
diffusion of information but link only a small portion of the organizations in the 
sense of control relationships. Such control relationships are most frequently 
intrasectoral, i.e., within the political and economic sectors. This is mainly a 
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result of the fact that in these sectors there are institutionalized relationships 
between organizations. Considering that this pattern is peculiar to these two 
sectors, it is therefore questionable whether one can interpret the number of 
intrasectoral positions as an indication of the power of a person (cf. Dye, 1983: 
175ff.). 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS AND PARTY PREFERENCE 
Up to now we have discussed how the amount of professional homogeneity 
among elites may contribute to elite integration. Next, we wish to examine the 
influence this has on the political attitudes and thus on the behavior of the elites. 
Political attitudes are never completely determined by socia1 structural variables. 
Hence, attitude cleavages must be regarded as an independent dimension of 
political conflict (Lehmbruch, 1969:285). This dimension can coincide in vary-
ing degrees with the structural c1eavages in a society. Scholars of the conflict 
theory have often pointed to the fact that a superimposition of several c1eavage 
lines normally leads to areduction of the number of conflicts with different 
opponents and to an intensification of the remaining conflicts. Conversely, cross-
cutting c1eavage lines contribute to an attenuation of conflicts since differing 
coalitions develop (cf. Dahrendorf, 1965b:224ff.). 
Therefore, in the following we shall analyze the degree of association between 
the structural variables discussed thus far and the political attitudes of elites. The 
association between social structure and political cleavages is often assumed to 
be a measure of the degree of subcultural segmentation in a society. If it turns out 
to be high, that can be considered an indication of the fact that structural charac-
teristics are transformed into political positions. 
Edinger and Searing (1967) have shown in their classic article that at least in 
industrial societies, social background variables do not influence the attitudes of 
elites. This result has been replicated in numerous other elite studies, including 
those of West German elites (cf. Schleth, 1971; Hoffmann-Lange et al. , 
1980:69). This has been brought about by the blurring of traditional subcultural 
cleavages which, in turn, lead to a decline in the association between social 
origin and present social status on the one hand and political attitudes and voting 
behavior on the other. 40 
Our analyses are not meant as another replication of these findings. Therefore, 
we did not analyze the relationship between social characteristics and the issue 
attitudes of the respondents. Instead, we have limited ourselves to an analysis of 
the association between the party preference of the respondents and the other 
variables. This is done for two reasons. First, party preference and issue attitudes 
are so closely related, particularly among elites, that the former can be consid-
ered as a relatively valid sign of a broad range of individual attitudes. Secondly, 
party preference is a measure of structural processes among elites. This is so 
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because parties compete less for elite votes than for power positions. Therefore, 
they try to gain influence over the recruitment of elite personnel in other sectors 
in order to tie the clientele of those sectors to their organization electorally, as 
well as 10 strengthen the chances of achieving their goals in the policy formation 
process in which these other elites play a major role. The analysis of the distribu-
tion of party preferences in the different elite sectors shows how far they have 
been successful. 
The analyses in this section have been limited to nonpolitical elites since 
political elites are defined by party and the relationships between party and the 
other variables can be assumed to be different for them. Given the fact that we 
Table 14. Party Affiliations of Elites and Nonelites: 
(a) Percentages based on number of respondents 
(b) Percentages based on number of valid answersQ 
n SPD CDU/CSU FDP Olher. N.A. 
Civil service (al 296 30.4 37.2 18.2 14.2 
(bl 254 35.4 43.3 21.3 
Business (al 285 8.4 63.5 11.9 16.1 
(bl 239 10.0 75.7 14.2 
Business (al 174 2.3 69.5 15.5 12.6 
associations (bl 152 2.6 79.6 17.8 
Trade unions (al 87 80.5 12.6 1.1 5.7 
(bl 82 85.4 13.4 1.2 
Mass media (al 222 16.7 43.2 18.5 21.6 
(b) 174 21.3 55.2 23.6 
Academic (al 130 15.4 38.5 16.9 29.2 
(bl 92 21.7 54.3 23.9 
Military (al 43 2.3 65.1 9.3 23.3 
(bl 33 3.0 84.8 12.1 
Cultural (a) 104 29.8 16.3 19.2 34.6 
(b) 68 45.6 25.0 29.4 
Other elites (a) 129 31.8 43.4 8.5 16.3 
(bl 108 38.0 51.9 10.2 
All nonpolitical (a) 1470 21.6 45.6 14.6 18.2 
elite, (b) 1202 26.5 55.7 17.8 
Population (a) 517 25.1 44.3 6.0 24.6 
(bl 390 33.3 58.7 7.9 
Federal 1980 42.9 44.5 10.6 1.8 
elections 1983 38.2 48.8 6.9 6.1 
AOnly 31 elite respondents ranked the Green Party first in sympathy. Therefore, percentages were based on the 
number of respondents with a first sympathy rank for one of the three "established" parties. 
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are dealing only with nominal variables it is difficult to detennine the relative 
strength of independent structural variables on dependent variable party prefer-
ence. Nevertheless, we ran some dummy variable regression analyses. Since the 
data do not, however, meet all of the metric and distributive assumptions of 
regression analysis, we cannot expect the resulting coefficients to reflect the 
value of the "true" associations with absolute accuracy, which means that the 
coefficients can only be interpreted tentatively. In addition, many of the indepen-
dent variables are highly intercorrelated, e.g., social class background and edu-
cation. This multicollinearity makes it impossible to interpret the regression 
coefficients because they depend on the order in which the variables are intro-
duced into the regression equation. Nevertheless, we assurne that the relative 
strength of the predictors is preserved even under these conditions if we look at 
the zero-order correlations and that we can grasp the overall explanatory power 
of the model by studying the multiple correlation coefficients. Table 18, to be 
discussed later, contains the correlation coefficients (Pearson' s r) for three 
groups of variables to be discussed in connection with the following: social 
background, present occupation, and memberships in voluntary associations. 
The standards for the distribution of party preferences41 in the different elite 
sectors are listed in Table 14. The basic pattern has not changed since 1968 and 
1972 (cf. Hoffmann-Lange et al. , 1980:48ff.). We cannot, however, detennine 
the causal processes which are responsible for these relationships. Theoretically, 
the distributions found in the different sectors can be traced back to four causes: 
the position itself, the deliberate personnel policy of nominators, the collective 
Table 15. Party Preference for the Social 
Democratic Party of Various Elite Sectors 
and Nonelites Over Time 
Percent SPDa 
1968/69 1972 1981/82 
Civil service 37.3 36.9 35.4 
Braadeasting media 34.0 57.1 34.7 
Press 33.0 37.1 21.6 
Academic elites 29.7 45.8 23.7 
Nonelites: 
General population 
surveys 47.0 54.0 33.3 
Elections for the 
Bundestag 1969, 
1972, and 1983 42.7 45.9 38.2 
apercentages based on respondents with a dear preference for 
ODe of the three major parties. Comparative figures for cultural 
elites are not availabfe. Figures for ehe 1969 and 1972 surveys 
relate to voting intention instead of party preference. 
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Table 16. Association Between Background Factors and Party Preference 
of Nonpolitical Elites 
(percentages based on number of valid answers) 
(a) Social Clas. Origin" 
SPD CDU/CSU FDP Total 
n % n % n % n % 
Bourgeoisie 9 8.7 76 73.1 19 18.3 104 9.4 
Small employers 25 21.7 71 61.7 19 16.7 115 10.4 
Petty bourgeoisie 28 29.8 50 53.2 16 17.0 94 8.5 
Managers 15 18.3 57 69.5 10 12.2 82 7.4 
Supervisors 64 20.9 165 53.9 77 25.2 306 27.8 
Semiautonomous employee, 60 23.3 157 61.1 40 15.6 257 23.3 
Workers ..!2 60.1 ...±! 28.7 ...!2 !!d ...ill 13.0 
Total 287 26.1 617 56.0 197 17.9 1101 
.p = 0.00; Cr.mer·, V = 0.24; x' = 127.3. 
(b) Educationb 
SPD CDU/CSU FDP Total 
n % n % n % n % 
Less than high ,ehool graduation 
(Abitur) 97 56.4 57 33.1 18 10.5 172 14.3 
High school graduation (Abitur) 221 21.5 613 59.6 195 .!LQ 1029 85.7 
Total 318 26.5 670 55.8 213 17.7 /201 
.p = 0.00; Cmmer', V = 0.2ß; X' = 92.3. 
(e) Religion and Church Atlendancec 
SPD CDU/CSU FDP Total 
Religion/Church Allen<umce n % n % n % n % 
Catholie,/regular attendance 9 5.3 154 90.1 8 4.7 171 14.5 
Catholie,/no regular attendance 44 22.8 120 62.2 29 15.0 193 16.3 
Prote,tants/regular attendanee 21 20.6 60 58.8 21 20.6 102 8.6 
Protestants/no regular attendanee 131 25.9 260 51.5 114 22.6 505 42.7 
No religious affiliation !!Q 51.9 ..,g 29.2 ...1Q ll:.2 .1ll 17.9 
Total 315 26.6 656 55.5 212 17.9 1183 
cp = 0.00; Cramer's V = 0.27; X' = 173.3. 
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rahle 16. (Continued) 
(d) Memberships 
SPD CDU/CSU FDP Total 
n % n % n % n % 
Trade unions 189 76.2 38 15.3 21 8.5 248 20.6 
Professional associations 71 19.6 222 61.2 70 19.3 363 30.2 
Religious lay organization 34 19.9 112 65.5 25 14.6 171 14.2 
Welfare organizations of the 
churches 8 12.3 49 75.4 8 12.3 65 5.4 
Welfare organization of the 
workers' movementd 104 88.9 9 7.7 4 3.4 117 9.7 
Independent welfare organizations 34 31.5 61 56.5 13 12.0 108 9.0 
Student fratemities 15 7.6 150 75.8 33 16.7 198 16.5 
Sodal clubs 40 12.2 236 71.7 53 16.1 329 27.4 
dArbeiterwohlfahrt. 
political orientations, or the individual opinion formation of the respondents. 
Only the first of these ean be considered as an impact of the sector in a strict 
sense. The eriteria used by nominators, instead, need not reflect autonomously 
defined seetor interests. It seems quite conceivable that extemal nominators are 
sueeessful in influencing the personnel recruitment, e.g., partyelites who want 
to induee favorable judicial decisions or media eoverage. By colleetive orienta-
tions, we mean that a consensus develops among the members of a sector whieh 
is, however, not systematically related to the funetions performed by this sector. 
We can assume that normally all four factors are simultaneously at work, 
although carrying different weights. Every attempt to determine these weights is 
neeessarily speeulative. We conjeeture that in the business sector and the trade 
unions, the agreement of sectoral interests with the policies advoeated by the 
different parties are responsible for the distributions found. In the eivil service 
and the media, however, eriteria of personnel reeruitment ean be assumed to play 
the most important role. The funetions performed by these two sectors do not 
automatically imply eertain poliey priorities. It is, however, instrumental for the 
parties to influence the personnel reeruitment in these seetors-whieh, in fact, 
they do. The politiealization of personnel poliey in the civil service and the 
broadeasting media is therefore a widely diseussed topie. 
In the military seetor, we assume that the three first-named faetors are equally 
important. Tbe military and defense poliey of the Christian Democrats is more in 
line with the sector interests. Seeondly, the CDU/CSU was obviously more 
sueeessful than the other two parties in exerting influenee on personnel reeruit-
ment. Finally, the German military traditionaJly has a eonservative orientation. 
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Table 17. Association Between Occupational Status, Social Class Origin, 
Religion, and Party Preference in the Population 
(percentages based on number of valid answers) 
(al OccupatioTIßI Status of Respondent" 
SPD CDU/CSU FDP Total 
n % n % n % n % 
Bourgeoisie/small employers 4.2 21 87.5 2 8.3 24 6.6 
Petty bourgeoisie 3 12.5 17 70.8 4 16.7 24 6.6 
Managers/supervisors 12 22.6 36 67.9 5 9.4 53 14.5 
Semiautonomous employees 24 28.9 50 60.2 9 10.8 83 22.7 
Workers J!1 46.2 ..22 49.5 ~ ...1d 182 49.7 
Total 124 33.9 214 58.5 28 7.7 366 
ap = 0.00; Cramer's V = 0.22; x2 = 34.0. 
(bl Social Class Originb 
SPD CDU/CSU FDP Total 
n % n % n % n % 
Bourgeoisie/small employers 3 10.0 26 86.7 3.3 30 9.0 
Petty bourgeoisie 7 16.7 30 71.4 5 11.9 42 12.5 
Managers/supervisors 3 20.0 10 66.7 2 13.3 15 4.5 
Serniautonomous employees 9 19.6 29 63.0 8 17.4 46 13.7 
Workers ..2! 45.0 lQ! 50.0 10 ~ 202 60.3 
Total 113 33.7 196 58.5 26 7.8 335 
.p = 0.00; Cramer's V = 0.24; X2 = 37.8. 
(el Religion and Church Attendance< 
SPD CDU/CSU FDP Total 
n % n % n % n % 
Catholies/regular attendanee 8 8.7 80 87.0 4 4.3 92 23.8 
Catholies/no regular attend.nce 24 32.0 46 61.3 5 6.7 75 19.4 
Protestants/regular .ttendanee 10 30.3 20 60.6 3 9.1 33 8.5 
Protestants/no regular .ttendance 76 46.6 71 43.6 16 9.8 163 42.2 
No religious affiliation -.!! 47.8 --2 39.1 ..1 13.0 ..fJ 6.0 
Total 129 33.4 226 58.5 31 8.0 386 
'p = 0.00; Cr.mer's V = 0.26; x2 = 50.6. 
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Table 17. (Continued) 
(d) Educationd 
SPD CDUICSU FDP Total 
n % n % n % n % 
Less Ihan high school graduation 
(Abitur) 119 35.1 198 58.4 22 6.5 339 87.6 
High schoo1 graduation (Abitur) -...! 16.7 .2! ~ ..2 gJ! ..§ 12.4 
Total 127 32.8 229 59.2 31 8.0 387 
dp = 0.00; Cramer's V = 0.19; X' = 12.5. 
The functions of the academic and cultural sec tors are the least political. 
Therefore, one can assurne that the political preference of an applicant plays only 
a subordinate role in personnel recruitment. We expect consequently that the 
party preferences in these politically less exposed sectors, to which we also add 
the press, are less stable over long periods of time and reflect the fluctuations of 
individual and public opinion formation. 42 This assumption is borne out by 
comparing the development of the party preferences of respondents in these 
sectors to those of the general public (Table 15). 
For the population, the fluctuations in the survey data are much more pro-
nounced than those in actual voting behavior. Similar fluctuations can be seen in 
the media and academic elites which indicate that the individual opinion forma-
tion in these sectors paralleis that of the general public. Quite obviously, the 
recruitment policy within the broadcasting media has much less influence on that 
opinion formation than many observers expected. Within the civil service elite, 
however, the nearly constant preference status of the SPD reflects the existence 
of stable power blocks governing the recruitment of leadership personnel. 
The figures in Tables 16 and 17 show that social origin, education, and 
religion all have a significant impact on the party preferences of both elites and 
the population at large. The coefficients of associations are, however, not very 
high and range between .20 and .30. They are not higher for the population than 
they are for the elites. This means that the impact of structural variables is not 
greater for the population, as previous results have suggested, a result also 
confirmed by the multiple correlation coefficients in Table 18. This impression is 
reinforced if we compare the party preferences of all nonpolitical elites to the 
population subgroups most comparable in occupational status, i.e., employers 
and managers (Table 17). Among all three groups, the Christian Democrats have 
a disproportionate number of supporters and the Social Democratic Party is 
underrepresented. This is especially true in comparison to the working class. It is 
only with regard to the Liberal Party that elites differ from the upper classes: to 
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exaggerate somewhat, one could maintain that the FDP is not only a bourgeois 
party but even an elite party. 
Table 18 shows that the sector variable explains nearly as much difference in 
party preferences as do the social background variables. The zero-order correla-
tions additionally confirm the intuitive impression one gets looking at the figures 
in Table 14, Le., that it is mainly membership in the business and trade union 
sectors wbicb determines party preference wbile in the civil service and the 
media there is little apparent relationsbip to the dependent variable. In general, 
sector location (situs) determines party preference more among the elites than 
social status does among the population at large (cf. also Table 17). However, 
more important tban this finding is tbe fact tbat botb variables are not Iinearly 
related to party preference: wbereas tbe re1ationsbip is strong for trade union 
elites and members oftbe working class, on tbe one hand, and business elites and 
the classes of employers or the self-employed, on tbe other, tbe members of the 
new middle class (i.e., managers, supervisors, semiautonomous employees, and 
most other elite sectors ) are structurally mucb less predetermined in favor of a 
certain political party. 
Tbe results for the membership of elites in voluntary associations (Table 16) 
confirm the assumption stated earlier that those memberships are primarily an 
expression of individual value orientations and therefore closely related to party 
preference. Members of the trade unions and the Social Democratic Welfare 
Association (Arbeiterwohlfahrt) are mostly supporters of the Social Democratic 
Party; those of professional associations, religious lay associations, student fra-
temities, and social clubs largely support the bourgeois parties. We included in 
the regression analysis only those organizations whose members showed the 
most skewed distributions either in favor of the Social Democrats or the Christian 
Democrats. The welfare organizations were, however, not taken into considera-
tion because they have too few members. 
We have included frequency of church attendance among the membership 
variables because it is an indication of the role the ascribed religious denomina-
tion actually plays for the respondent. Unfortunately, the effects of both vari-
ables cannot be disentangled because the sizeable proportion of respondents 
without religious denomination, by definition, does not go to church and most 
Protestants are also not regular churchgoers. Tberefore it seems advisable to look 
at the combined effect of both variables rather than at the separate effects, even if 
this is not greater than the effect of each of the variables taken separately. 
Nevertheless, the separation of both variables in the regression model shows that 
denomination alone continues to playamajor role in determining party prefer-
ence and issue attitudes of elites as well as of voters (cf. also Hoffmann-Lange et 
a1., 1980:69). 
Due to tbe obviously high multicollinearity of the predictor variables, the 
multiple correlation coefficient for all tbree groups of variables is only .48 
among elites. Our structural variables thus explain less than one-quarter of the 
Table 18. Correlations Between Social Background, 
Present Occupation, Membership in 
Voluntary Associations, and Preference for 
the Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU) 
1. Sodal background 
Social class backgrounda 
Educationb 
Religious denominationc 
Multiple correlation coefficient r 
Squared multiple correlation coefficient r2 
2. Present occupation 
(a) Elites<' 
Civil service 
Businesse 
Trade unions 
Mass media 
(b) Nonelites 
Employer or self-employed 
Manager, supervisor, semiautonomous 
employee 
Worker 
Multiple correlation coefficient rf 
Squared multiple correlation coefficient r2 
3. Membership in voluntary associationsR 
Frequency of church attendanceh 
Trade unions 
Social clubs 
Student fratemities 
Multiple correlation coefficient r 
Squared multiple correlation coefficient r2 
4. Overall relationship 
Multiple correlation coefficient r 
Squared multiple correlation coefficient r2 
Elites 
.16 
.12 
.26 
.31 
.10 
-.09 
.26 
-.17 
-.02 
.30 
.09 
.24 
-.34 
.17 
.19 
.41 
.17 
.48 
.23 
Nonelites 
.16 
.05 
.25 
.29 
.09 
.17 
.09 
-.17 
.22 
.05 
.26 
.26 
.07 
.37 
.14 
G(l) Employer, self-employed. manager, supervisor, semiautonomous employee; (0) 
worker. 
b(l) High school graduation; (0) no high school graduation. 
c(l) Catholic; (0) Protestant Of no religious affiliation. 
dMembership in other sec tors is the implicit fifth dummy variable which bad to be 
excluded from analysis for mathematical reasons. Since it is a heterogeneous re-
sidual variable including the smaller sectors, i.e .. academic. cultura1, military, and 
other elites, its zero-order correlation was not computed. 
"Including business corporations and business associations. 
!for the population data, the third dummy variable was not included in the regression 
model because it is implied by its linear relationship to the other two dummy 
variables. 
HThe questions concerning membership in voluntary associations were not included in 
the questionnaire for the general population survey (discussed earlier in this paper). 
Frequency of church attendance is analyzed as a membership variable because it can 
be conceived as an expression of the current importance the respondents attribute 10 
their church membership, which was otherwise c1assified as a background variable. 
h(l) Frequent; (0) seldom or never. 
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variance in the preference for the Christian Democratic Party. Given the rather 
unrefined statistics this seems acceptable even if party preference is far from 
being fully determined by these predictors. In order to compare the explanatory 
influence of the independent variables between elites and nonelites, we had to 
rerun the regression analysis without the membership variables which were not 
available for the population. The multiple correlation coefficient for the elites 
dropped in this run from .48 to .42. It is still higher than the coefficient for the 
nonelites, which means that sec tor is not only a more important indicator of elite 
attitudes than is occupational status of voter attitudes, but also that it is less 
associated with background variables. 
Altogether, we found a rather differentiated pattern with regard to the overlap 
among sector and party lines. For business and trade union elites both lines 
overlap almost completely, whereas in the civil service, mass media, academic, 
and cultural elites supporters of aJl parties can be found. Assuming that religion 
has to be conceived of as a variable of value orientation rather than as a back-
ground variable, the association between social background (class origin and 
education) and party preference is rather weak. Therefore, the conclusion seems 
justified that conflict between party lines means primarily conflict between dif-
ferent political goals. For the definition of the goals, in turn, the sector interests 
of business and Irade unions playamajor role. As long as we are willing to 
interpret party competition as indicative of political conflict within the elites, this 
conflict is rather pronounced. Among the elites, however, the competing parties 
and sectors are not equally strong. The trade unions and the Social Democrats are 
numerically much weaker than business and the Christian Democrats. 
CONCLUSION 
Elite integration cannot be discussed without reference to a more general model 
of societal integration. One possible model is that of a social system differenti-
ated vertically according to occupational status, education, wealth, and political 
influence, Le., a class or a power elite model. In choosing such a model, the 
question arises how vertical integration of a society is possible, i.e., how mass 
loyalty to elite rule can be maintained. The horizontal integration of elites under 
such a model results automatically from the common interest of elites to preserve 
their status and is facilitated by their small numbers. "Generally , the social 
structure is more closely tied together at the top than at the bottom" (Galtung, 
1966:162). Elite integration, in this model, serves to maintain the existing dis-
tribution of privileges. The main conflict line runs between upper and lower 
classes or between elites and nonelites. 
Pluralist theory, as weil as the theory of "consociational democracy," instead 
conceives of society as segmented horizontally by religious, ethnic, and occupa-
tional (situs) lines or by analytically defined functions. These theories tend 
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therefore to consider the problem of horizontal rather than vertical integration of 
a society. They have raised the question of how binding political dedsions can be 
reached in a highly differentiated society. It presupposes the existence of an elite 
consensus on the rules of political decision making and a sense of responsibility 
for the overarching needs of the entire society among the elites, i.e., the willing-
ness to transcend one' s group interests. 
In the first model, elite integration is characterized by social homogeneity and 
shared interests; in the second, by sodal heterogeneity and value consensus, as 
weil as cooperation in political decision making across group and sector lines. In 
our analysis we have tried to determine which of these two models is more in line 
with the empirical data. For that purpose, indicators of social and occupational 
homogeneity were examined. Whereas sodal homogeneity was thought to pro-
mote informal elite integration through friendship ties based on similar back-
grounds (homophyly), similar recruitment patterns were assumed to further the 
professional integration of elites since they indicate that elite nominators value 
universally applicable leadership qualifications more than specialized 
knowledge. 
What can be said now on the basis of our data about elite integration in West 
Germany? The main result is that the sodal and professional heterogeneity found 
among the elites does not support the assumption that a cohesive power elite 
exists in Germany. It offers little basis for informal elite integration. The various 
structural bases of informal elite integration, i.e., membership in social clubs or 
other associations, regional proximity, similar background or shared occupa-
tional experiences, are alllimited to smaU segments of the elites. Thus, informal 
elite drcles which doubtlessly exist in West Germany as they do everywhere, do 
not provide a sufficient basis for a more inclusive decision-making elite circle. 
With regard to the representation of interests by elites, we have to state first 
that elites in the Federal Republic differ significantly from the population at large 
in their social characteristics. If, however, we differentiate the latter according to 
occupational status, our data indicate the validity of the "Iaw of increasing 
disproportion" rather than a qualitative distinction between elites and nonelites. 
In this respect, one has also to consider the role of Sodal Democratic politidans 
and trade union leaders as representatives of the lower classes. They differ less in 
social background and education from the population than other elites do. 
The analysis of career patterns, too, gave no indication that the requirements 
for elite positions differ qualitatively from those for other positions: the low level 
of intersectoral elite circulation shows that specialized knowledge and profes-
sional experience are obviously more important than general leadership qualifi-
cations. Given the fact that the social composition of the elites is not representa-
tive of that of the population at large, we have examined in the previous section 
the question of whether this has consequences for the goals and the behavior of 
elites . The associations between background variables were indeed significant 
but not very powerful. Putnam's question, "Agglutination: so what?" 
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(1976:41), can be answered again by stating that social background contributes 
little to the explanation of elite attitudes. 
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NOTES 
I. Tbere is a vast body of literature relevant to this assumption. For further referenees see Higley 
et al. (1979), Bachrach (1964), McClosky et al. (1960), Barton (1974). and Hoffmann-Lange et al. 
(1980). 
2. Tbe tenn consensus refers to the extent to whieh beliefs, values, and attitudes are shared by 
the members of a group. Tbus, it is one type of elite integration. Tbe tenn integration, in referring to 
political beliefs, is normaUy used to indicate the degree of eonsislency among several belief. of an 
individual. 
How far consensus concerning the "rules of the game" is accompanied by a consensus concerning 
political goals is an empirieal que.tion. While power elile theorisls have always assumed that the 
members of an elite have a great many interests in common, the most important of which is the 
inlerest 10 preserve Iheir presenl elile Slalus, olher scholars have assumed that Ihere may be eonsider-
able eonfliet of interests within an elile whieh at Ihe same time exhibits a high degree of proeedural 
consensus (cf. Field and Higley, 1984; Kadushin, 1979; Lehmbruch, 1969; Baehraeh, 1964). 
3. See Offe (1974). These Iheories try to explain why, even in demucratic soeieties, politieal 
decisions nonnaUy do nol jeopardize Ihe exisling distribulion of privileges. lt is traeed back by them 
to deliberate manipulation on the part of elites. Offe, instead, advoeates a structural theory aeeording 
to which routinized decision-making structures and democratic ideology ensure maintenance of the 
status quo. 
4. Laumann and Pappi distinguish three types of interpersonal relations wh ich eomspond to our 
three subtypes of structural elite integration: (I) informal sucial relations, (2) business-professional 
relations, (3) diseussions of eommunity affairs (1976: 135ff.). Tbis distinetion eomsponds to the 
three general types of networks deseribed by van Poucke: sentiment networks, puwer networks, and 
interest networks (1979/80:181). 
5. It is, however, only a suffieient, not a necessary, eondition for the development of friendship 
ties. Tbe latter ean also be based on other faetors. In a recent study, Feld (1982) demonstrates that the 
usually high eomspundenee between soeial similarity and friendship ties (homophyly) ean in part be 
traeed to the fact that "focused sets" tend at the same time to bring suciaUy similar people together 
and to promote friendship ties. Tbe development of friendship ties among sociaUy similar persons 
may thus be primarily a result of the sucial compusition of "focused sets." Feld's resullS allow the 
speeulative conclusion that friendship ties will presumably also develop among socially and profes-
sionally heterogeneous elites. 
6. See Hoffmann-Lange et al. (1980:60). Tbis assoeiation is normaUy stronger among elites than 
among general populations as the empirieal resulls of Converse (1964) and MeClosky et al. (1960) 
have shown. 
7. See Edinger and Searing (1967), Sehleth (1971), and Hoffmann-Lange et al. (1980:69). 
8. The study is suppurted by a grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. We appretiate 
the help of the Zenlrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA), Mannheim, and GET AS, 
Bremen during the field work and data management proeess. A maehine-readable codebook prepared 
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by the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, Cologne, is avaHable at the University of 
Mannheim. 
9. Machine-readable codebooks are also avaHable for these studies at the Zentralarcbiv in 
Cologne. 
10. Moore and Alba have used another measure which, however, does not differentiate hetween 
the entirely subordinate and the lower professionalized occupations. Since this distinction is impor-
tant for educational aspirations and political behavior, we decided to use Wright's scherne. 
11. Wright et aJ. operationalize class according to seven different criteria (l982:714ff.). 
12. The data of our population survey show clearly that the agglutination theory of Putnam is 
only a special case of mobility theory: higher-status groups in general tend to come from higher-status 
families. 
13. Wornen are similarly underrepresented among the elites with only 2.8 pereent. 
14. The formula was developed by Weisherg (1968:128): 
Ph'/Ph' ad - bc I 'm .. : (c + d) (c + a) 
under the conditions ad > bc and b > c. These conditions can always he realized by an 
adequate exchange of rows and columns. 
15. The hypothesis of high educational aspirations as the main factor responsible for career 
achievements among the elites is supported by the fact that only 38.2 pereent of the fathers of our 
respondents had a high school degree. In addition, Dur population data show !hat persons with high 
school degrees are disproportionately drawn from families with certain occupational backgrounds: 
employers with at least 10 employees, self-employed professionals, higher civil servants and man-
agement (managers and supervisors). Especially among the self-employed professionals and the 
higher civil servants control orientalion should he less pronounced than for instance among small 
employers. Th. latter, in turn, show lower educational aspirations. 
16. Souree: Claessens et al. (1974:470). 
17. Source: Frankfurter Rundschau, April 4, 1983. 
18. Source: Kaack and Roth (1980:82). 
19. In contrast to 1972, not all sUhdepartment heads in federa! ministries but only !hose in the 
most important ministries were included in !he 1981 study. The higher proportion of party members 
in this latter group in 1981 may thus be due to the fact that political affiliation plays a more important 
role in personnel recruitment in these ministries. 
20. Paradoxically, among the cultural elites working for the press there are more porty memhers 
than among the politicol journalists and editors. In the broodcasting media the relationship is re-
versed, as one would have expected. 
21. Party of the party members: SPD CDU/CSU FDP 
Administrative heads of state ministries-
Social Democratic administrations 82.7 1.9 15.4 
Administrative heads of state ministries-
Christian Democratic administrations 2.9 91.4 5.7 
Administrative heads and department 
heads in federal ministries 62.5 15.0 22.5 
Suhdepartment heads in federal ministries 54.5 21.2 24.2 
Trade unions 86.0 14.0 0.0 
Moss media 39.2 51.3 9.5 
22. Figures from lacobi et al. , 1981 :199. Memhers of the Association of CivH Servants (Deu-
tscher Beamtenbund) were excluded. The 1972 study included only 0 general question conceming 
membership in trade unions and proftssional associations whereas in 1981 the respondents were 
asked to include the name of the associalion. The combined numhers are therefore smaller in the 1981 
study (cf. Hoffmann-Lange et 01., 1980:78). 
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[n some eases it was rather diffieult to decide whether an assoeiation should be eonsidered as a 
trade union oe a professional association since the lauer aee also often involved in negotiations 
eonceming working eonditions. We finally deeided to restriet the trade union eategory to me member 
unions of the West German Trade Union Federalion (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) and me 
Union ofWhite-Collar Employees (Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft, DAG). Tbe AssociatioD of 
Civil Servants was instead considered as a professional association. 
23. Tbe number of civil servants in the DGß has risen by a margin uf 146 percent from 1950 to 
1979. Tbe organization ratio of wltite-collar employees rose from 19.0 percent in 1960 10 22.1 
pereent in 1975 (cf. SIreeck, 1981:474). The number of those who approve of a statement mat the 
Irade unions do not beltave correctly declined arnong white-collar empluyees from 48 pereent in 1953 
to 38 pereent in 1973 (cf. Pappi, 1977:221). 
The organizational figures for journalists is unknown, but the DOB claims that 12,000 journalists 
belong to one of its member unions (internal souree). 
24. Some 3.5 pereent of these are members of the Civil Servants Association (cf. Jaeobi et a1., 
1981:199) and 5.4 percent are members of other professional associations. Wo had to rely on the data 
of the National Social Survey 1980 (ALLBUS; cf. Lepsius et al., 1982:258) for these figures. 
Because af the small number of members of such associatians in a general population survey with 
only 3000 respondents these figures must be eonsidered somewhat unreliable, providing only a rough 
estimate of the real pereentage. 
25. Tbe latter figure is presumably samewhat inflated since double memberships eould not be 
excluded. 
26. See Dye (1983:216). Der Spiegel (1983:60,63) uses a similar argument. lt even claims that it 
is the main function of these clubs ta give their less prominent members the feeling of belonging to 
the elites. 
27. In the Federal Republie, military elites are , rather, overrepresented in the social clubs. 
According to Der Spiegel tltis is due to tlte aspirations of the German military to regain its former 
prestige. 
28. See Pappi (1979). 
29. Synchronous means tltat a respondent simultaneously holds positions in more titan one 
sector , whereas diachronous indicates that he has been active in more than ODe sector during his 
career. 
30. In 1981, the pereentage oflrade union leaders without a Itigh sehool degree is even somewhat 
higher (80.5 pereent compared to 77.8 pereent in 1972). This may, however, be eaused by tlte 
additional inclusion of some distriet leaders and hence a different sampie composition. 
31. Unfortunately, we were not able to find data to confirm this. 
32. Some 83.0 percent of the respondents in the press, but also 29.0 pereent of those in the 
broadeasting media, named the press as the first sector of tlteir oceupational eareer. 
33. We have restrieted the group to those respondents who either nomed only one field of 
university studies or have acquired a law degree. Thus, respondents for whom law studies were not 
the main subject were excluded. 
34. Tbe term projessionalizalion is used Itere in 0 rather loose sense and does not presuppose 
formalized edueational requirements. It means nothing more than a tendency of polities to become 0 
full-time occupation and to institutionalized politieal eareer patterns (cf. Herzog, 1982:94; von 
Beyme, 1971:\09ff.). 
35. Tlte analysis of career patterns among eultural e1ites was thus restrieted 10 joumalists, Le., 
those respondents with full-time employment in tlte moss media. Publishers were excluded because 
tltey normally Itave a different oceupational background. 
36. Tbese were only 5.6 pereent of tlte respondents of the sectors included in tlte analysis. 
37. Individual respondents may have been aetive in more than one other sector. Tbe civil service, 
business enterprises, and science/higher education sectors were in general, the ones mentioned most 
frequently as former sectors. 
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38. For political elites cf. Herzog (l975:150ff.). and von Beyme (l971:155ff.). 
39. These board memberships were usually on boards of public enterprises, mostly public utHity 
enterprises , 
40. For tbo Ihesis of decreasing class and religious vote cf. Baker et al. (1981: 165ff.). and Pappi 
(1977:214). 
41. Party preference was defined as the first sympathy rating on the familiar party thermometer. 
42. Party lines playa less prominent role in the West German press because most newspapers 
stress their political independence. They normoUy hove only • broad general politicalleaning toward 
a more conservative or more liberal outlook. 
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